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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper documents a strong negative relationship between investor sentiment, proxied by the 
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index, and cost of equity capital, suggesting that the market 
prices the predominant market-wide sentiment along with other risk factors. Furthermore, we 
investigate whether certain features of product market affect expected returns through investor 
perceptions. While we find no significant marginal effect of sentiment in competitive industries 
(where sales are spread across many firms), we show that the effect of market overreaction is 
more pronounced for unique industries (measured by the industry’s median ratio of selling ex-
pense to sales).  Finally, we observe an inverse relationship between sentiment and industry av-
erage degree of market synchronicity (measured by the magnitude of explained variation in stock 
returns based on the market model). Specifically, we find that the implied cost of equity for in-
dustries with lower average market synchronicity is more (negatively) sensitive to investor sen-
timent. Our findings are in line with those observed in the behavioural finance literature, which 
show a more pronounced effect of sentiment on highly volatile stocks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether investor sentiment affects industry cost of eq-
uity capital. Do certain industry-specific characteristics, such as degree of concentration, special-
ized products and information availability, affect the relationship between investor sentiment and 
cost of equity? Theory presents somewhat conflicting predictions thus an answer to these ques-
tions remains purely empirical.   
The behavioural hypothesis suggests that when arbitrage is limited, noise-trader senti-
ment, which is characterised by the behavioural finance literature as being an irrational belief 
about future cash flows and investment risk that is not based solely on currently available infor-
mation, may persist in the market, such that assets that are held mainly by individual investors 
may deviate from their fundamental values for significant periods of time (DeLong et al., 1990). 
Therefore, sentiment appears to be an omitted risk factor in existing asset pricing models. 
Classical finance theory does not take into consideration investor sentiment. Stock prices 
reflect the discounted value of expected cash flows, and rational investors choose stocks based 
on their statistical properties, holding diversified mean-variance efficient portfolios (Markowitz, 
1959). However, the history of capital markets provides evidence of systematic patterns of mis-
pricing where stocks deviate substantially from their fundamental value. This deviation, on the 
other hand, cannot be explained by the standard finance theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). 
Behavioural finance suggests an alternative model of asset pricing built on two basic as-
sumptions. First, investors are subject to sentiment. In each period rational investors and irra-
tional noise traders trade assets based on their respective beliefs, the former’s being based on 
current information, possibly including the expected optimism or pessimism of the latter’s. Thus, 
the equilibrium price reflects the opinion of both types of investors (DeLong et al., 1990). 
Second, because of limits to arbitrage, which arise because arbitrageurs are likely to be 
risk averse and have short time horizons, fluctuating prices are not always forced to fundamental 
levels (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, the unpredictability of noise traders’ sentiment 
causes additional risk in the market.  In other words, betting against not-fully-rational investors is 
risky and can be costly. If noise traders’ sentiment is stochastic and noise traders act in concert, 
they might cause systematic risk, which cannot be diversified away. Therefore, investor senti-
ment, like other sources of systematic risk, should be priced in equilibrium (Lee et al., 1991), and 
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if so, it should show up as a significant factor affecting cost of capital. Assets that have greater 
exposure to noise trader risk are riskier, thus investors holding such assets should expect higher 
returns on their investment. 
Prior work in the field of behavioural finance concentrates mainly on the sentiment-return 
relation. Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that investor sentiment has significant cross-sectional 
effect on stock returns. Brown and Cliff (2005) relate sentiment levels directly to stock price de-
viations from their intrinsic value and find that sentiment can predict security returns. On the 
contrary, Elton et al. (1998) find that the sentiment index computed from closed-end funds is not 
a factor in the return generating process. These contradictory results suggest there is something 
missing in the previous analysis, which may be rooted in i) the indirect approach to measuring 
sentiment as a separate factor from economic fundamentals, or ii) the use of realized returns as 
proxies of expected return, which may be a poor proxy of expect returns. 
Our study differs from previous research because we test the impact of irrational agents 
on the cost of equity using a forward-looking proxy of cost of equity instead of relying on aver-
age realized returns or using traditional asset pricing models to generate a proxy of expected re-
turn. In spite of the extensive work done on studying potentially priced risk factors, finance re-
search has come to the conclusion that estimates of the expected returns based on average real-
ized returns are notoriously noisy and extremely imprecise (Fama and French, 1997).  Elton 
(1999) provides additional arguments that conventional ex post returns provide a poor estimate 
of expected returns.  
Our study makes a contribution to the existing behavioural finance literature by using an 
alternative and forward looking proxy of cost of equity to test the effect of sentiment on asset 
pricing. We use the cost of equity generated using accounting based valuation models that esti-
mate an ex ante return required by investors implied in market prices and analysts forecasts and 
we find a strong robust negative relationship between sentiment, measured by Michigan Con-
sumer Sentiment Index, and cost of equity.  
Furthermore, we build on the existing sentiment literature by incorporating product mar-
ket characteristics into our industry based analysis. We find that product markets affect expected 
returns through investor perceptions. By doing so our study helps understand the perceived risk 
associated with the prevailing sentiment in the market and how this perception varies across in-
dustries depending on a number of industry characteristics – industry concentration, product 
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market specialization and stock market synchronicity.
1
   
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 motivates why investor sentiment 
should affect industry cost of equity and outlines the hypotheses. The hypotheses development is 
presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 defines the regression variables and shows the descriptive sta-
tistics. Chapter 5 outlines the main findings of the paper. Chapter 6 provides robustness tests. 
Chapter 7 concludes the paper.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Firm level market synchronicity is measured using R
2 
derived by regressing firm excess returns on the market ex-
cess returns. Industry level market synchronicity is the average of firm level R
2
 statistics by Fama and French 48 
industries. The market model R
2
 is predicted to be inversely related to the quality of the information environment 
(Morck et al., 2000). 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELATED LITERATURE AND MOTIVATION FOR OUR STUDY 
 
2.1. Investor Sentiment  
One of the central propositions of modern finance theory is the efficient market hypothesis, 
which in its simplest formulation states that the current price fully reflects all available informa-
tion. Investors are assumed to be perfectly rational and are supposed to make investment deci-
sions using all available information. Competition among these rational investors results in an 
equilibrium in which prices equal the discounted value of future cash flows and only the system-
atic risk is priced. Even if some investors act irrationally, rational arbitrageurs trade against them 
and drive prices toward their fundamental values (Fama, 1970).  
However, the classical finance theory fails to explain the existence of systematic mispric-
ing in the capital markets. Behavioural finance provides an alternative to the standard model. It 
argues that financial phenomena can be understood better if we assume that investors are not 
fully rational. In this setting, asset pricing incorporates not only how expected returns are related 
to risk but also how returns are affected by investor misvaluation.  
2.1.1. Irrational Agents and Mispricing 
 
An individual’s investment decisions are affected by a variety of cognitive and emotional 
biases that may lead them to deviate from fully rational behaviour. Such biases are for example 
overconfidence, representativeness, conservatism, and informational inferiority complex 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). Overconfidence is one of the most strongly observed behavioural biases. It 
has both direct and indirect effects on the way information is processed. The direct effect is that 
individuals place more weight on information they collect themselves. The indirect effect arises 
when new information is filtered in a way to maintain the individual’s confidence. Thus, inves-
tors may systematically overweight information that supports their initial decisions and down-
play or ignore information that contradicts them or is inconsistent with their beliefs (Daniel and 
Titman, 1999). 
De Bondt and Thaler (1995) argue that investors are subject to waves of optimism and 
pessimism that cause prices to fluctuate systematically around their intrinsic values and later ex-
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hibit mean reversion. From a psychological point of view, this overreaction to past events is con-
sistent with the behavioural decision theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1973). It states 
that investors are systematically overconfident in their ability to forecast future prices. As Burton 
(2003) points out, this provides justification for the investment techniques that are based on a 
contrarian strategies, such as buying the stocks or portfolios that have been out of favour for long 
periods of time and avoiding stocks and portfolios that have been highly popular in recent years. 
Pepper and Oliver (2006) argue that if deviations of the stock price from its fundamental 
value persist for a long time, extrapolative expectations can result. In other words, the tendency 
to expect that price changes will continue in the direction observed recently will proceed. Ex-
trapolative expectations provides a rational for momentum trading with the effect that price fluc-
tuations are likely to continue in one direction. Behavioural finance explains this using represen-
tativeness (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
If these expectations about persistent imbalance of the intrinsic value are widespread 
among traders, this can result in a herding behaviour, which may not be outweighed by rational 
traders who try to restore the price. This excess optimism involves more trading, and subse-
quently pushes the prices even further away from their fundamental value. The same principle 
applies to the opposite scenario when excess pessimism drives the stock prices far below their 
intrinsic value. Through herding and led by extrapolative expectations, noise traders can drive 
the prices to unrealistically high or low values and generate bubbles or crashes (Hirshleifer, 
2001). 
Even though psychology-based asset-pricing theory has a great potential for capturing re-
ality, it still lacks quantified models that reflect mispricing. Moreover, it could be misleading to 
generalize the psychological biases to another context and another set of people, especially when 
it comes to investors’ behaviour in stock markets (Chandra and Sharma, 2010). Real investors 
and market interactions are too complicated to be summarized by a few biases. Instead, a broader 
macroeconomic approach should be adopted (Hirshleifer, 2001). Recently, it has been proposed 
that sentiment affects stock prices (Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2000, 2006, 2007). However, it’s not clear whether this effect derives 
mainly from expected cash flows or discount rates.  
Behavioural finance is based on two assumptions: i) the existence of sentiment among 
investors and ii) limits to arbitrage. De Long et al. (1990) propose an asset pricing model that 
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incorporates the idea of irrationality. In this model, there are two types of investors: rational in-
vestors and noise traders. Rational investors form rational expectations about stock prices, 
whereas noise traders form their expectations subject to sentiment. Noise traders may falsely be-
lieve that they have special information or a better interpretation, which would give them an ad-
vantage in the capital market. So when they form their investment strategies, they tend to overes-
timate asset prices in some periods and underestimate them in others.  
DeLong et al. (1990) assume that the sentiment that affects noise traders’ asset valuation 
is stochastic and cannot be completely predicted by the sophisticated investors. This creates addi-
tional risk in the market. If the noise traders’ sentiments affect many assets and are correlated 
among different noise traders, then this additional risk cannot be diversified and just as system-
atic risk it should be priced in equilibrium. In other words, the equilibrium price of assets would 
reflect the opinions of both rational and irrational traders.  
The second assumption is that sophisticated traders cannot eliminate these price devia-
tions from fundamental values by trading against the noise traders as the classical finance theory 
proposes, because betting against unsophisticated investors is costly and risky. Arbitrageurs tend 
to be risk averse and usually have limited time horizons (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In addition 
to the fundamental risk, arbitrageurs also encounter the risk that the biased beliefs of irrational 
traders will persist. For example, if noise traders are driven by pessimism, they drive prices 
down. So, an arbitrageur buying the asset faces the risk that in the future the price might go down 
even further subject to growing negative sentiment. Moreover, arbitrageurs do not get the full 
proceeds of a short sale which means that the hedge is not costless. As a result, they might need 
to liquidate to obtain funds. If the arbitrageur needs to liquidate her position before the prices 
return to fundamental values, she suffers a loss. As a result of the limited time horizon and due to 
risk aversion, arbitrageurs’ willingness to take positions against noise traders is limited and mis-
pricing of assets may persist. 
In a response to noise traders’ investment strategy, it is optimal for the sophisticated trad-
ers to exploit the noise traders’ irrational misperceptions. Rational traders buy when prices are 
depressed due to an overly pessimistic attitude of noise traders, and sell when irrational inves-
tors’ belies are driven by excess optimism. Such a contrarian investment strategy helps balance 
stock prices towards equilibrium, but because of the limits to arbitrage, prices generally may fail 
to reach their fundamental value. 
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2.1.2. Sentiment Proxies 
 
Investor sentiment is not straightforward to measure, and even though there are several proxies, 
so far there is no consensus about which one provides the best results (Baker and Wurgler, 
2007). There are two basic types of market sentiment indices: those that are based on polling or 
surveying investors and those derived from market data under a theory relating them to senti-
ment. Some of the most popular proxies used in the behaviour finance literature are as follows: 
Investor Surveys: 
The survey-based sentiment proxies require that consumers are identified as the individual retail 
investors that DeLong et al. (1990) refer to as noise traders. There are various indices that indi-
cate the expectations for the market.  
 Solt and Statman (1988) show that the sentiment measure of Investors’ Intelligence is 
not a useful predictor of stock returns fluctuations. However, Brown and Cliff (2005) provide 
evidence that investor sentiment using survey data as a proxy for investors’ optimism/pessimism 
affects asset valuation. Fisher and Statman (2003) show that consumer confidence is correlated 
with other sentiment proxies such as the sentiment measure of the American Association of Indi-
vidual Investors. Qui and Welch (2006) find that surveys measuring investor sentiment are re-
lated to other widespread sentiment proxies as well as market returns. The presence of an irra-
tional element in consumer confidence, measured by the University of Michigan Consumer Sen-
timent Index, is supported also by Doms and Morin (2004) who show that even after controlling 
for economic fundamentals, the measures of consumer confidence tend to be influenced more by 
the tone and volume of the news media rather than actual economic events. Lemmon and Portni-
aguina (2006) find similar results. They decompose consumer confidence (University of Michi-
gan Consumer Sentiment Index and Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index) into eco-
nomic fundamentals and investor sentiment and show that the component that accounts for sen-
timent among investors forecasts the returns of small stocks and stocks with low institutional 
ownership.  
The two most popular measures of consumer confidence are the University of Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Index (Doms and 
Morin, 2004). Although the financial markets and the business community closely follow both 
indices, the majority of published academic research uses the Michigan Index (Bram and Lud-
vigson, 1998). There are several reasons that might explain why the University of Michigan 
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Consumer Sentiment Index is the preferred choice for finance research.  
First, it has longer history compared to the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence 
Index. Second, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index focuses more on financial 
conditions, and more specifically on individual’s own conditions, whereas the Conference Board 
survey concentrates more on general macroeconomic environment. Therefore, for the purpose of 
examining the effect of sentiment in the capital market, the Michigan index seems to be more 
appropriate. In addition, the surveyed individuals do not overlap, thus the Michigan index tends 
to pick up some economy-wide sentiment factors rather than the conditions of the respective re-
spondents (Qui and Welch, 2006). 
Furthermore, the Michigan Consumer sentiment Index provides information not only 
about attitudes regarding current financial condition, but also about individual’s expectations for 
one year ahead as well as long-term expectations (5 years ahead). Last but not least, the Michi-
gan survey has intrinsic sampling methods that address certain issues associated with sample se-
lection biases.  
Retail Investor Trades: 
Lee et al. (1991) identify noise traders or unsophisticated traders with individual investors and 
show that small stocks are disproportionally held by individuals as opposed to institutional inves-
tors. Kumar and Lee (2006) examine the effect of retail trading patterns on comovement in stock 
returns. They find that trading activities of individual investors contain a common directional 
component. When some investors are buying/selling stocks, other investors tend also to buy/sell. 
As investors become more bullish/bearish, these stocks experience higher/lower returns.  
Considering these findings, Kumar and Lee (2006) construct sentiment measures for re-
tail investors based on whether they are buying or selling. Kumar and Lee (2006) find that retail 
investors tend to concentrate their holdings and trading activities in smaller, low price stocks of 
firms with lower institutional ownership. These are also the type of stocks that are affected by 
retail investor sentiment to the greatest extent.  
Closed-end Fund Discount: 
Closed-end funds are investment companies who issue a fixed number of shares, which are then 
traded on the stock exchange. They are held and traded primarily by individual investors. The 
closed-end fund discount is the average difference between the net asset values of closed-end 
fund stocks and their market prices. Lee et al., (1991) show that fluctuations in these discounts 
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are driven by changes in individual investor sentiments. 
When noise traders are pessimistic they drive stock prices down, thus, reducing the dis-
count premium. When they are subject to negative sentiment, they undervalue the stock prices 
and the discount premium goes up. Because of these fluctuations in the discount, arbitrageurs 
take only limited positions and mispricing persists. 
Trading Volume: 
Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that if short-selling is constrained, high liquidity can be per-
ceived as a sign that the market is dominated by irrational investors. Those unsophisticated trad-
ers add liquidity to the market when they feel optimistic, so higher trading volumes would indi-
cate overvaluation and abnormally low subsequent expected returns for both firm-level and ag-
gregate data.  
Dividend Premium: 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) define dividend premium as the difference between the average mar-
ket-to-book ratios of dividend payers and non-dividend payers. Usually, dividend-paying stocks 
are perceived as less risky with more predictable future cash flows as they are associated with 
larger and more profitable firms. As a result, the demand for stocks with these characteristics is 
inversely related to the prevailing investor sentiment. 
Initial Public Offerings First-day Returns and Volume: 
The IPO market is often viewed as being sensitive to sentiment with high first day returns repre-
senting investors’ enthusiasm (Loughran et al., 1994). Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest that 
IPO volume can also be used as a sentiment proxy. They claim that the underlying demand for 
initial public offerings is perceived to be extremely sensitive to the prevailing sentiment in the 
stock market. 
Equity Issues over Total New Issues: 
The share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues is another measure that captures inves-
tors’ sentiments. Baker and Wurgler (2000) argue that it shows that rational managers take ad-
vantage of temporary mispricing in the stock market by issuing equity when stocks are over-
priced.  Their study shows that high values of the equity share predict low market returns. 
Combined Sentiment Index: 
A common approach in the literature is to use a combined sentiment index consisting of several 
of the above mentioned proxies (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Using a combined sentiment index, 
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Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that investor sentiment has a significant effect on the cross-
section of stock prices. 
Based on all these findings, we adopt the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index as our 
main sentiment proxy.
2
 For our robustness tests, we use the Baker and Wurgler (2006) composite 
index, which is based on the common variation in six underlying market-based proxies of senti-
ment. These proxies capture sentiment from both the supply (Equity Issues/Total New Issues) 
and demand sides (IPO volume, Trading Volume, Closed-end Fund Discount) of the capital 
market and the index is adjusted for the potential lead-lag relationship between supply and de-
mand manifestations of investor overreaction. In addition, the composite index takes into consid-
eration the business cycle and is adjusted for macroeconomic factors. 
 
2.1.3. Sentiment and Firm Characteristics 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that mispricing may arise through two distinct channels: i) 
cross-sectional variation in sentiment, and ii) variation in the difficulty of arbitrage. They define 
investor sentiment as “the propensity to speculate.” Thus, the most vulnerable stocks to noise 
traders’ mispricing are those for which objective valuation is most difficult. Prior studies (e.g. 
Lee et al., 1991; Baker and Wurgler, 2000) show that such firms are generally characterized as 
being small, young, unprofitable, non-dividend paying, having high volatility, and being in 
growing industries. The lack of earning history combined with unlimited growth opportunities 
encourages unsophisticated investors to speculate with future prices and discourages risk arbi-
trage by sophisticated investors (Wurgler and Zharavskaya, 2002). Thus, the stocks that are diffi-
cult to value are the same ones that are difficult to arbitrage.  
When relating sentiment levels to stock mispricing, different studies find contradictory 
results. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that investor sentiment has a significant 
cross-sectional effect on stock returns. Brown and Cliff (2004) relate sentiment levels directly to 
stock price deviations from its intrinsic value and find that sentiment can predict security returns. 
On the contrary, Elton et al. (1998) find that the sentiment index computed from closed-end 
funds is not a factor in the return generating process. 
However, when this relationship is explored in the long run (6 to 36 months), the litera-
ture finds results that are consistent with the theory. Brown and Cliff (2005) argue that it is more 
                                                          
2
 More details regarding the sampling and the questionnaire are provided in Appendix 2 
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plausible to view sentiment as a persistent variable. They focus on the long-term reversal of re-
turns to fundamental value because even though, arbitrage forces may eliminate short-term mis-
pricing, they might not hold at longer time horizons. Using Investor Intelligence Indicator as a 
sentiment proxy, Brown and Cliff (2005) find that excessive optimism leads to periods of market 
overvaluation which in turn is followed by low cumulative long-run returns as the market price 
reverts to its intrinsic value.  
Neal and Wheatley (1998) study the forecast power of three sentiment proxies: the level 
of discount on closed-end funds, the ratio of odd-lot sales to purchases and the net mutual fund 
redemption. They find that net fund redemptions predict the size premium and the difference be-
tween small and large firm returns. They observe a positive relationship between discounts and 
small firms’ expected returns but no relationship with large firms’ returns. These results are con-
sistent with the investor sentiment hypothesis, which states that small firms’ stocks are primarily 
held by small investors. 
 
2.2. Implied Cost of Capital 
 
Prior research in the field of behavioural finance suggests that models of pricing and expected 
returns need to incorporate the role of investor sentiment. Thus, sentiment should be systemati-
cally related to the cost of equity. Following research in accounting and finance, we use an ex 
ante valuation approach to estimate the return required by investors based on stock prices and 
analyst earnings forecasts (Gebhardt et al., 2001, Claus and Thomas, 2001, Botosan and Plumlee, 
2005).  
 
2.2.1. Advantage of the Ex Ante Approaches for Estimating the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
Since cost of capital is not directly observable, it is important to find a model that provides an 
accurate estimate. Some of the most commonly used approaches for estimating cost of capital in 
financial economics literature are the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) and the arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976). The empirical testing of these mod-
els requires measures of expected returns that are generally substituted by an average of realized 
asset returns. However, as Elton (1999) points out, the historical average is a poor proxy for ex-
pected returns.  
Fama and French (1997) show some potential problems with cost of capital when using 
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the CAPM and their three-factor pricing model (Fama and French, 1993). They conclude that the 
uncertainty about the true asset pricing model, combined with imprecision in the estimate of risk 
loadings and risk premia lead to imprecise estimates of cost of capital at the firm level as well as 
at the industry level. Fama and French (2002) show that valuation models provide a more precise 
expected risk premium estimate that tracks fundamentals in a manner suggested by the valuation 
theory. 
In order to obtain an alternative and potentially more accurate measure of the cost of 
capital, the recent literature suggests a forward-looking approach for estimating the cost of equity 
capital. The collective evidence from these studies shows that this forward-looking approach 
deals with many of the flaws of the standard asset pricing models and its main appeal is that it 
does not rely on noisy realized asset prices (Lee et al., 2010). 
 
2.2.2. Implied Cost of Equity and Sentiment  
 
Prior studies that use ex post return estimates to examine pricing effects of behavioural models 
find results that contradict the theory on the effect of sentiment on returns. These conflicting em-
pirical findings might be partially due to the choice of realized return as a proxy for expected re-
turns. A model that incorporates investor sentiment will have more credibility if it uses forward 
looking returns, and has a sound theoretical basis. Therefore the ex ante valuation models pro-
vide a promising foundation for incorporating sentiment into asset pricing. This will provide in-
sight into not only how expected returns are related to risk, but also about how required returns 
are affected by investor misvaluation. 
Previous literature uses the ex ante cost of capital estimates to examine a broad range of 
financial empirical questions. For example, Hail and Leuz (2006) study the effect of legal institu-
tions and securities regulations across 40 countries, Dhaliwal et al. (2006) explore the association 
between leverage, corporate and personal taxes, and firm’s cost if equity capital, and Boubakri et 
al. (2010) examine the effect of corporate governance on cost of equity to name a few.  
As prior literature argues (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Gode and Mohanram, 2003) accounting 
based valuation models provide richer context in which to explore the market’s perception of 
risk. In that sense, since in the behavioural framework sentiment is perceived as affecting sys-
tematic market wide risk, the forward-looking cost of equity approach is an appropriate choice 
for our analysis. 
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Chen (2011) provides evidence that the accounting based cost of equity estimates could 
be used to explore the behaviour of capital market participants.  The author shows that sentiment 
correlates positively with both expected earnings growth and expected cost of equity capital. 
Chen (2011) argues that the required rate of return equals the amount of risk times the price of 
risk, and these two aspects can vary in different directions as investors become more optimis-
tic/pessimistic. For example, if investors are subject to positive sentiment, they tend to overesti-
mate expected growth and underestimate the amount of risk. As far as the price of risk, it might 
go up as investor sentiment increases. As a result, the increase of the price of risk might surpass 
the decrease in perceived risk during periods of high sentiment. 
Previous research has already suggested that behavioural finance can explain the equity 
premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). Bernatzi and Thaler (1995) show that the equity 
premium can be partly explained by a cognitive bias called loss aversion, which is the tendency 
for individuals to be more sensitive to reduction in their levels of wealth than to increases. In 
other words, investors dislike negative changes in wealth so much that they would accept a much 
lower expected return to avoid potential losses. Thus, loss averse investors refuse to hold equity 
securities unless they receive disproportionally large expected returns. 
Since equity premium is a notional concept, a possible way to justify any measure is to 
examine its relationship with variables that affect the firm’s risk as perceived by investors (Gode 
and Mohanram, 2003). In this sense, one of the strengths of the implied cost of equity estimate is 
that it is correlated with many known risk proxies. Previous literature has found that the implied 
cost of equity is significantly associated with return volatility, information availability measured 
by firm size or analyst following, book-to-market ratio, earnings growth, earnings forecast vari-
ability, and industry risk premium (Botosan, 1997; Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 
2003).  
Previous studies have also found relations with a number of market mispricing anoma-
lies. Stocks with higher past realized returns tend to earn higher subsequent returns. If price mo-
mentum is a risk proxy, then high momentum stocks should have a high implied risk premium 
(Gebhardt et al., 2001). However, momentum is a phenomenon often related to investor senti-
ment. Another such example is turnover. High turnover firms should have lower ex ante implied 
risk premia (Gebhardt et al., 2001). On the other hand, Baker and Stein (2004) suggest that li-
quidity can be used as a sentiment proxy. Irrational traders add liquidity to the market when they 
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feel optimistic; therefore higher trading volumes are perceived as a signal of overvaluation.  
Finally, if market prices reflect fundamental value, the implied cost of equity and ex post 
realized returns should be positively correlated especially over longer horizons (Frankel and Lee, 
1998). Likewise, Brown and Cliff (2005) show that in the long run we can observe the sentiment 
– return relationship.  
This empirical evidence reinforces the previously discusses theoretical argument that sen-
timent is an omitted risk factor in asset pricing models. 
 
2.2.3. Analyst Forecasts 
 
One of the potential strengths of the ex ante valuation models is the use of analysts’ forward-
looking information, which is perceived to be a more precise measure of market expectations 
compared to the average of realized returns. It is assumed that the stock market efficiently incor-
porates analysts’ forecasts into stock prices and that analysts make unbiased forecasts (Claus and 
Thomas, 2001). 
Prior research has linked investor’s different cognitive biases as well as the prevailing in-
vestor sentiment to analysts’ forecast (Guay et al., 2003) but yet there is no direct test of the ef-
fect of sentiment on the derived cost of equity estimates from these forecasts.  
Lys and Sohn (1990) show that analyst forecasts fail to incorporate new information in a 
timely manner. Consistent with this finding, Guay et al. (2003) argue that the sluggishness of 
analysts with respect to information in past stock prices results in a predictable error in the im-
plied cost of capital. It is well established in the literature that security analysts are prone to over-
react given the available information. De Bondt and Thaler (1990) show that forecasts are too 
optimistic and too extreme, and these results are stronger for longer forecast horizons. Claus and 
Thomas (2001) find similar results. Their study shows evidence of a “systematic optimism bias” 
in the earnings forecasts that increases with the forecast horizon. In addition, analysts tend to be 
more optimistic for firms with low book-to-market ratios, low earnings-to-price ratios, and high 
levels of capital expenditures (Dechow et al., 1996). Similarly, Guay et al. (2003) find that ana-
lysts’ forecasts are more optimistic for small firms and growth firms. La Porta (1996) as well as 
Dechow et al. (1996) show that stock prices naively incorporate analyst’s long-term earnings 
growth forecasts even though these forecasts are systematically biased. If sophisticated traders, 
such as analysts, face problems with processing stock market information and give forecasts sub-
 15 
 
ject to heuristics, then we would expect that the investment strategies of noise traders would be 
even more influenced by overreactions. 
On the other hand, the excess optimism observed in analyst forecasts might also be a re-
sult of agency problems. That is, optimistic forecasts are preferable for brokerage firms, which 
generally make more buy recommendations than sell recommendations (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1990). Moreover, analysts derive some of their expertise from the executives of the companies 
they follow, which might motivate analysts to present the firm in a favourable light (Easterwood 
and Nutt, 1999). Cowen et al. (2006) find that trading incentives, firm status and types of clients 
are among the factors that contribute the most for excess optimism among analysts. Therefore, 
higher optimism is distinct to brokerage firms that provide retail services. Moreover, sell-side 
analysts may stop issuing reports about stocks they don’t find attractive, which also contributes 
to their general optimism. 
On the contrary, other studies find that analysts systematically underreact to prior earn-
ings information (Abarbanell and Benrad, 1992; Lys and Sohn, 1990). This tendency for analysts 
to underreact to new information can be explained by the psychology of decision making, which 
claims that individuals have bounded rationality and tend to underreact to new information that 
conflicts with their initial beliefs (Barberis et al., 1998). Gleason and Lee (2003) argue that as a 
result of analysts’ partial adjustment, their past revision actually predicts future forecast errors. 
As opposed to both of these streams of research, Easterwood and Nutt (1999) argue that 
analysts react differently depending on the nature of the earnings information. More precisely, 
they underreact to negative information and overreact to positive information, which suggests 
that analysts are systematically optimistic.  
Ding et al. (2004) use prospect theory to explain stock market reactions resulting from an 
earnings surprise. They find that, due to investor loss aversion, stock returns react strongly to 
positive earnings surprises, whereas negative earnings surprises have no significant influence on 
returns. In other words, investors are reluctant to realize their losses during negative earnings 
surprise. Ding et al. (2004) also find that analyst forecasts tend to be accurate during positive 
earnings growth and highly optimistic during negative earnings growth, which is associated with 
the presence of positive investor sentiment (proxied by the American Association of Individual 
Investors’ Sentiment Survey). 
If analysts have a reason to be optimistic in their forecasts and their optimism bias is en-
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tirely explained by economic incentives, this would mean that they are not affected by sentiment. 
However, as pointed out by Cowen et al. (2006) sell side analyst forecasts are aimed mainly at 
retail investors who are prone to irrational trading to the greatest extent. If the same individual 
investors, who are identified with the noise traders in the stock market, follow overly optimis-
tic/pessimistic forecasts and recommendations, they might transfer this overreaction to the mar-
ket and cause additional risk. This gives us another reason to explore the association between 
sentiment and cost of equity estimates derived from market price and analysts’ forecasts and ex-
pand the literature on the effect of behavioural factors on the analysts’ forecasts. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Our choice of industries as a unit of analysis is mainly motivated by Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999, p.1288) who argue that “firms within an industry tend to be highly correlated; they oper-
ate in the same regulatory environment, exhibit similar behavior in the corporate finance area, 
are similarly sensitive to macroeconomic shocks, and are exposed to similar supply and demand 
fluctuations.” They find strong evidence that industry portfolios exhibit significant momentum 
even after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, individual stock momentum, the cross-
sectional dispersion in mean returns and potential microstructure influences.  
If we relate these findings to the behavioural finance theories, the pronounced industry 
momentum effect could be explained by investor cognitive biases such as overconfidence and 
self-attribution (Daniel and Titman, 1999). As previously discussed, the individual stocks mo-
mentum anomaly has already been broadly explored and linked to investors bounded rationality 
(Barberis et al., 1998; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Pepper and Oliver, 2006). Given the results 
that industry momentum is never subsumed by individual stock momentum, slow information 
diffusion and extrapolative expectations hold not only at firm level but also at industry level, 
causing industry mispricing (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999).  
Since investors face certain challenges in processing new information, they tend to group 
assets into categories and, thus, simplify their portfolio decisions (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). 
Because of this bounded rationality, noise traders allocate funds at the level of some particular 
categories or habitats rather than at the individual asset level because of transaction costs, trading 
restrictions or lack of information. In this instance, correlated sentiment among noise traders cre-
ates herding behaviour (Barberis et al., 2005). Sentiment literature has already explored the ef-
fect of unsophisticated trading activities on portfolios based on size and growth opportunities. 
However, categorization based on industry characteristics has yet to be explored. 
An industry-based analysis is also motivated by the fact that the majority of Wall Street 
analysts who provide earnings forecasts and buy and sell recommendations specialize by indus-
try. Boni and Womack (2005) show that industry aggregate analyst recommendations provide a 
better understanding of market efficiency and price momentum. For example, aggregate recom-
mendation across all analysts by industry provides better signals for future returns compared to a 
non-industry approach. Another finding suggests that industry average recommendations (up-
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grades/downgrades) are strongly influenced by preceding industry level returns suggesting that 
analysts take into account industry returns when they revise their opinions about the stocks they 
follow.  
Using industry averages of cost of equity estimates could mitigate some of the concerns 
associated with analysts’ forecast sluggishness and excess optimism. For example, even if ana-
lysts try to present some firms in a favourable light because of certain incentives, the effect of 
these optimistic forecasts could be reduced by taking industry averages. Furthermore, valuation 
models used in the estimation of cost of equity rely on assumptions about different inputs, which 
could increase the likelihood of spurious results. Taking an average estimate over four different 
models is a common approach to minimize such spuriousness (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2006). In that sense, using an industry average of cost of equity could further help avoid spu-
rious estimates. 
Based on the literature discussed so far, we find both theoretical arguments as well as 
empirical evidence that suggest retail investor sentiment is an omitted risk factor in the asset 
pricing models. However, whether this effect derives from expected cash flows or discount rates 
remains largely unexplored. We test whether sentiment affects the required rate of return by us-
ing forward looking estimates of expect returns (i.e. implied cost of equity). 
Chen (2011) examines the relationship between investor sentiment and expected cost of 
equity capital measured with ex-ante valuation models. The author finds a positive correlation 
between sentiment and cost of equity by studying two distinct channels through which sentiment 
affects asset valuation: earnings growth and required rate of return. Chen (2011) conducts his 
tests using firm level data. As opposed to his study, we concentrate on the aggregate effect of 
sentiment on industry-average cost of equity and we form our hypothesis based on the premise 
that given the annual frequency of our data, patterns of correction of mispricing are easier to de-
tect rather than the mispricing itself.  
If sentiment indeed cannot be diversified away because of limits to arbitrage, then it 
should be priced and therefore, sentiment should negatively affect the industry average implied 
risk premium. 
H1: Investor sentiment is negatively related to industry cost of equity. 
In other words, as noise traders become more pessimistic, or when they are driven by 
negative sentiment, they require higher rates of return on their investments, since they believe 
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that there is more risk involved. If rational arbitrageurs cannot eliminate their effects because of 
limits to arbitrage, the cost of equity should incorporate the pricing of both rational and irrational 
traders. On the other hand, if noise traders are overly optimistic, they would overvalue certain 
firms. This in turn, would result in a lower cost of equity once the mispricing is corrected. 
Adopting an industry based approach requires taking into account the industry market 
structure and its asset pricing applications. Building on industrial organization theory, Hou and 
Robinson (2006) argue that the structure of its product market affects a firm’s operational deci-
sions, which in turn can have an impact on the riskiness of the firm’s cash flows. Therefore, the 
structure of the product market may affect the firm’s stock return. Hou and Robinson (2006) 
shows that firms in more competitive industries earn higher returns even after controlling for 
size, book-to-market equity, momentum and other factors. These results hold for both industry 
and firm level analysis. 
Hou and Robinson (2006) propose two channels through which product market structure 
can affect asset prices. In their paper they focus on the risk-based channel, linking industry con-
centration to stock returns through innovation and barriers to entry. Creative destruction 
(Schumpeter, 1912) predicts that firms that engage in more innovative activities are riskier and 
have higher returns. A more recent study of Knott and Posen (2003) finds empirical evidence 
that innovation increases with the degree of industry competition. On the other hand, Bain (1954) 
argues that concentrated industries are more profitable and face less distress risk. Hou and Rob-
inson (2006) find supportive evidence for both risk determinants through which product market 
structure affects stock returns. They show that firms in more concentrated industries are less 
risky and earn lower returns because they engage in less innovative activities and are better insu-
lated from undiversifiable aggregate demand shocks. 
The other potential channel through which the structure of the product market could af-
fect cash flow risk is indirectly through investor perceptions. Hou and Robinson (2006) suggest 
that it could be behavioural bias that causes investors to undervalue firms in more competitive 
industries resulting in higher ex post returns. This is the channel we will focus on and test 
whether investor sentiment effect varies with industry concentration. 
The link between stock market performance and firms’ competitive environment is also 
supported by Gaspar and Massa (2006). They find that firms with strong market power have 
lower idiosyncratic volatility. The proposed arguments for this finding are that firms operating in 
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concentrated industries have lower information uncertainty for investors, hence, lower volatility. 
In addition, market power could be used as a hedging instrument and therefore leads to lower 
idiosyncratic fluctuations.  
Irvine and Pontiff (2009) provide further evidence for the relationship between the inten-
sity of product market competition and stock returns. Their international study shows that the 
recent upward trend in increasing idiosyncratic volatility in the financial markets is attributable 
to an increasing competitive market environment. In addition, this study incorporates the infor-
mation availability measure, based on market model returns R
2
s, arguing that information opacity 
affects country’s business environment, which in turn has effect on stock returns. They also ob-
serve that after deregulation takes place in certain industries, increases in competition coincides 
with increases in idiosyncratic risk. 
As an extension of these studies, Peress (2010) explores more closely the link between 
firms’ market power in the product market and their stocks in a perfectly competitive stock mar-
ket. Higher market power stimulates trading, including that of insiders who presumably have 
privileged information, and enhances the information incorporated in stock prices. Thus, earn-
ings’ forecasts for these firms are less dispersed, stock liquidity is increased, volatility of profits 
and stock returns is lowered, and these firms have lower expected returns. In other words, prod-
uct market imperfection, or monopoly power, is not transferred to the financial markets. Instead, 
market power helps mitigate information and allocation efficiency (Peress, 2010).  
Gaspar and Massa (2006) find that the high variability of analyst earnings forecasts about 
firms operating in competitive industries indicates that these firms are easier to speculate with 
since objective valuation is more difficult compared to firms with greater market power. Fur-
thermore, Lee et al. (1991) show that the stocks most vulnerable to noise traders mispricing are 
those with high volatility. Therefore, we expect that sentiment should have a stronger negative 
effect for more competitive industries. 
H2: The negative relationship between cost of equity and investor sentiment is stronger for firms 
in industries with lower degree of concentration. 
Aspara and Tikkanen (2008) argue that the same individual investors who engage in trad-
ing stocks also engage in product consumption. Thus, individuals’ attitudes toward certain prod-
ucts are transferred over to the stock market. For example, consumers could have a positive atti-
tude towards the idea of social responsibility, therefore consuming products by companies with 
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such practices and respectively investing in the same companies. Aspara and Tikkanen (2008) 
also propose that an individual’s positive attitude toward a company positively influences his 
optimism and overconfidence in forming expectations about earnings and price of the company, 
which in turn influences his tendency to buy/hold stocks.  
To test this, we consider industries with products that don’t have direct substitutes or 
switching to a substitute would impose extra costs to the consumers (either directly or through 
brand loyalty). Thus, industries with a high level of product uniqueness as measured by the ratio 
of selling expenses to sales (Wessels and Titman, 1988) should be affected by investor sentiment 
to a greater extent. 
H3: The impact of investor sentiment on cost of equity is stronger for industries with greater 
product uniqueness. 
Lastly, we look into the relationship between information availability and the effect of inves-
tor sentiment on industry cost of equity. Intuitively, industries with more information asymmetry 
between firms and investors should be more susceptible to the prevailing sentiment in the market 
as objective valuation is not straightforward. We follow a recent stream of literature (e.g. Morck 
et al., 2000; Durnev et al., 2003) that nominates market synchronicity, measured by the magni-
tude of explained variation in stock returns based on the market model, as a proxy for informa-
tion availability. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that since obtaining information is costly, informed 
trading would be more prevalent in stocks for which private information about fundamentals is 
cheaper. Thus, more intense informed trading leads to “more informative pricing.” In other 
words, firm-specific variation, as measured by the R
2
 statistic from regressing the market model 
or a similar asset pricing model, is related to informativeness of the stock prices. Roll (1988) 
provides empirical support that arbitrageurs’ trading is especially important for the capitalization 
of firm-specific information, and idiosyncratic volatility is not associated with public information 
releases. However, Roll’s (1988) overall conclusion is that high firm-specific price fluctuations 
could be a sign of either more information due to active trading by informed arbitrageurs, or it 
could be associated with less information due to noise traders. 
Subsequent researchers favour the interpretation that firm-specific volatility refers to a 
better information environment and market efficiency. Morck et al. (2000) give further evidence 
that the R
2
 statistic obtained from the market model is an indicator of information quality. They 
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find less synchronicity across returns by firms in countries where investors’ property rights are 
better legally protected. A U.S. based study by Durnev et al. (2003) show that lower R
2 
statistic, 
or higher firm-specific variation, indicates prices closer to fundamentals, which results in more 
informational efficient stock prices and more efficient capital allocation. Durnev et al. (2004) 
explore capital budgeting decisions and find that lower market synchronicity leads to more effi-
cient corporate investments.  
Peress (2010) provides evidence for a positive relationship between industry structure 
and price informativeness. Industry mispricing caused by investor misvaluation is expected to 
vary across industries depending how susceptible industries are to investor speculations.  
Less industry specific information suggests that investors rely more heavily on the overall 
market risk when trying to valuate certain stocks. Therefore, market risk has greater weight in 
pricing these industries. Since sentiment is considered to be a systematic risk, it should have a 
more pronounced effect on industries that move with greater synchronicity with the market. This 
results in our forth hypothesis: 
H4: The effect of investor sentiment on cost of equity is more pronounced for industries with a 
poorer information environment, measured by higher market synchronicity. 
Given all theoretical arguments and supportive empirical findings, we believe that prod-
uct and capital markets are interrelated. Thus, studying industry based valuation in the investor 
sentiment context, taking into account industry concentration, product market uniqueness and 
stock market synchronicity with the market, would make a valuable contribution to the existing 
literature of behavioural finance. Moreover, this paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the 
effect of sentiment on expected cost of equity capital measured using forward-looking valuation 
models. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
4.1. Investor Sentiment 
 
Our main sentiment proxy is the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index provided by Michigan 
Consumer Research Center, SENTIMENT (S).
3
 Our choice of sentiment proxy is mainly moti-
vated by Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Qui and Welch (2006) who show that consumer 
confidence has an effect on asset valuation. As argued by Qui and Welch (2006), Michigan Con-
sumer Confidence Index focuses more on financial conditions compared to other consumer sur-
veys whose focus is mainly on macroeconomic factors. Thus, Michigan Consumer Confidence 
Index is a better measure of economy-wide sentiment and suits the purpose of our study. We ob-
tain annual data for the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index from Federal Reserve Economic 
Data.
4
 
 
4.2. Industry Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
In order to compute the cost of equity estimates, financial data is obtained from Research In-
sight/Compustat database and analysts’ earnings forecasts and pricing information from Thomp-
son Institutional Brokers Earnings Services (I/B/E/S). All firms contained in the Compustat files 
for the period between 1990 and 2006 are downloaded and then matched to the companies cov-
ered in I/B/E/S summary files. All cost of equity estimates are computed as of the month of June 
of each firm year.
5
 All firms are required to have: 
 a positive mean earnings forecast for the first 2 years; 
 a reported long-term growth rate: either a 5-year mean growth rate or a 3-year 
earnings forecast; 
 at least two analysts providing earnings forecasts for years 1 and 2; 
                                                          
3
 For robustness, we also use Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) composite sentiment index, which relies on measures de-
rived from financial markets. It is based on the first principal component of six popular sentiment proxies: value-
weighted dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004), IPO volume (Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1994), closed-
end fund discount (Neal and Wheatley, 1998), equity share in new issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2000), and NYSE 
turnover (NYSE Factbook). These six proxies are standardized and each of them has been also orthogonalized with 
respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. The data is available from Jeffrey Wurgler’s official website, 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/. 
4
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UMCSENT/ . The data is not seasonally adjusted and the units of the 
downloaded series is “Natural Log of Index 1st Quarter 1966=100.” 
5
 The cost of equity estimates are obtained from Mamun and Mishra (2010). 
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 a price for the corresponding statistics record period in the I/B/E/S price history 
file. 
Previous research proposes several models for estimating the implied cost of capital. All 
of them are based on the discount cash flow valuation theory. However, as they vary in their im-
plementation, the derived estimates have different properties. In order to avoid spurious results 
associated with the use of only one model, we adopt the approach of Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and 
Boubakri et al. (2010) and compute the average cost of equity based on the four models: 
Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and 
Easton (2004).
6
 We subtract the 3-month US Treasury bond yield from the estimated cost of eq-
uity, which gives us the implied equity risk premium that we use as our dependent variable 
(    ).  
Then, we estimate industry level risk premium proxies using industry-year average of the 
cost of equity premiums for all firms within a certain industry based on Fama and French 48 In-
dustry Classification. Our choice of industry level analysis further mitigates the concern of spu-
rious results and aims to provide a better proxy of industry average cost of equity.  We require 
that firms have all four estimates of cost of equity in order to be included in our sample. This re-
sults in 679 Fama-French industry-year observations for non-financial industries. 
 
4.3. Information Availability 
 
In order to obtain a market synchronicity proxy as a measure for information availability, we use 
the R
2 
statistic from market model regressions. Previous literature (Roll, 1988; Durnev et al., 
2003; Durnev et al., 2004) obtain firm-specific variation by regressing firms’ total returns on 
market and industry returns. For our industry level analysis, we start by calculating the R
2 
statis-
tic by regressing firm excess returns on the excess market returns and then averaging the R
2
 sta-
tistics by industry following Fama and French’s 48 industry classification. 
The R
2
 estimates are based on monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP) for the period between 1987 and 2006. The market portfolio proxy is the 
CRSP value-weighted market index. We require that the excess returns over the risk free rate for 
both firm and market level have minimum of 36 valid return observations in a window of 60 
months preceding the month of December for each year.  Then, we run the following regression 
                                                          
6
 For a detailed description of the four models used for estimating cost of equity refer to Appendix C. 
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each year for firm i over the past 60 months: 
                                                                               ,                     (4.1) 
where  
       is firm i’s excess return in past month j for year t, 
       is firm i’s total return in past month j for year t, 
       is the risk-free rate (3-month US Treasury Bill) in past month j for year t, 
       is the value-weighted market portfolio return in past month j for year t, 
     is firm i’s market beta for year t, and 
       is the residual from the market model regression for firm i in past month j for year t. 
Using the R
2 
statistics from the regressions above, we calculate RI
2
-year averages across 
all firms within industry I of each Fama and French 48 industry classification for each year. In 
order to distinguish systematic variation and firm-specific variation, we follow Roll (1988) and 
use a standard variance decomposition, which let us express industry-average R
2 
which by defini-
tion is    
   
       
, where SSE is the explained variation, and SSR is the unexplained variation. 
Equivalently:  
                                                
   
    
 
    
       
                                                                    (4.2) 
Consistent with the practice in the literature,
7
 we define a RI
2
 based measure that we use as our 
dependent variable SYNCH: 
                                                          
7
 Roll (1988) uses (1 -   ) as a proxy for information availability. However, Durnev et al. (2004), Durnev et al. 
(2003) circumvent the bounded nature of R
2
         by using a logistic transformation: 
     
     
 
   
    
where     . For the purpose of our analysis we adopt a synchronicity measure in the form:  
            
   
 
     
    
which increases with RI
2
. 
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                                                          (4.3) 
This transformation also has the characteristic that: 
                                                     = ln (    
 ) – ln (    
 ).                                                   (4.4) 
Thus, a higher SYNCH indicates that the portion of explained variation is relatively greater than 
the portion of unexplained variation, implying a lower firm-specific return variation. On the 
other hand low SYNCH implies high firm-specific variation. As argued by the literature (Morck 
et al., 2000, Durnev et al., 2003), stocks with a high firm-specific return variation are relatively 
less sensitive to market risk factor, hence they are more likely to have a low SYNCH. Equiva-
lently, SYNCH measures the lack of information availability as it is inversely related to the level 
of firm-specific information available in the market. 
 
4.4. Industry Concentration 
 
We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index, which is defined as: 
                                                                           =     
 .                                                      (4.5) 
Where    
  is the market share of firm i in industry I. We use net sales (Compustat item #12) 
scaled by total industry sales to calculate market share for all Compustat firms in each industry 
according to Fama and French 48 Industry classification in the period 1990 to 2006 (Masulis et 
al., 2007). The Herfindahl index provides information about the level of competition that exists 
within an industry, and also about the distribution of market share across the firms included in 
the index. Small values of the Herfindahl index imply that the industry is highly competitive and 
market shares are more evenly distributed across market participants, while large Herfindahl val-
ues mean greater market concentration in the hands of few firms. We define an industry as com-
petitive if the Herfindahl index is in the bottom quartile of all 48 Fama and French industries fol-
lowing Masulis et al. (2007). 
 
4.5. Product Uniqueness 
 
Product uniqueness is defined as the industry’s median ratio of selling expenses (Compustat item 
#189) scaled by sales (Compustat item #12). Wessels and Titman (1988) argue that firms that 
produce specialized products tend to spend more in promoting and selling their products. There-
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fore, selling expenses over sales should be positively related to uniqueness. Following Masulis et 
al. (2007) we define an industry as unique if it is in the top quartile of all Fama and French 
(1997) industries for each year. 
 
4.6. Control Variables 
 
When specifying our control variables we follow previous research that has nominated several 
variables as significant determinants of the cost of equity estimates (Gebhardt et al., 2001; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2006). We follow closely the cost of equity controls proposed by Dhaliwal et al., 
(2006) who control for risk by including Fama and French three risk factors suggested in their 
study on industry cost of capital:           and     . We borrow the industry level aver-
ages of loadings for Fama and French (1993) risk factors from Mamun and Mishra (2010).
8
 
We use bMKT – the industry average loading beta from regressing firms’ excess returns 
on market excess returns - to control for the effect of systematic risk. The Capital Asset Pricing 
Model suggests a positive correlation between market beta and cost of equity. Botosan (1997) 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2006) find a significant, positive correlation between implied cost of capital 
and beta. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between the cost of equity estimates and 
bMKT. 
 In our models we use the industry average of bSMB – the loading against the portfolio of 
small minus big firms - as a proxy for size, which is associated with information availability. In-
vestment risk increases when information about the firm is difficult to obtain. Larger firms and 
firms with greater analyst coverage (as a proxy for information availability) are expected to have 
a lower cost of capital because easily available information lowers the information asymmetry 
between a firm and its investors (Gebhardt et al., 2001, Easley et al., 2002). Thus, we expect that 
cost of equity is positively related to out proxy for size and information availability – bSMB. 
bHML is the loading against the difference between the returns to a portfolio of high 
book to market stocks and the returns to a portfolio of low book to market stocks. Since high 
book to market ratio suggests lower growth opportunities, lower accounting conservatism or 
higher perceived risk (Gode and Mohanram, 2003), literature predicts a positive relationship with 
cost of equity (Aggarwal et al., 2011). If these types of stocks are undervalued, they should earn 
                                                          
8
 The three risk factors           and      are estimated using a minimum of 24 observations of firm-level 
monthly excess returns over the past 60 month ending in December of the year when the cost of equity is estimated 
and regressing them on Fama and French’s three factors. 
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an abnormally high implied risk premium until the mispricing is corrected (Fama and French, 
1992). The positive association with book to market ratio has already been documented in the 
cost of equity literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 
2009) Thus, we would expect cost of equity to be positively related to bHML.  
In theory, a firm’s risk premium should be an increasing function of the amount of debt 
in its capital structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Fama and French (1992) document a posi-
tive relationship between market leverage and ex post mean stock returns (average of historical 
returns). Empirical evidence about the positive relationship between leverage and cost of equity 
has been shown by Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Dhaliwal et al. (2006). Based on theory and 
empirical results, we expect that leverage has a positive effect on implied risk premium. We 
measure leverage as the ratio of total debt to total capital. 
Earnings forecast variability is a source of risk for firm valuation. It also tends to capture 
fundamental cash flow risk (Gebhardt et al., 2001). We measure earnings forecast variability as 
the industry average of the standard deviation of one year ahead analysts’ earnings forecasts 
scaled by the mean of one year ahead earnings forecasts (COEFVAR). This variable captures the 
disagreement among analysts regarding earnings forecasts and the way it is constructed makes it 
comparable across firms with different number of analysts following (Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
Thus, firms with high earnings forecast variability would be harder to value objectively because 
there is more information asymmetry between the firm and the investors. Therefore, these firms 
are riskier and are expected to have higher cost of equity (Gode and Mohanram, 2003). 
  La Porta (1996) shows that because of analysts’ systematic optimism, high long-term 
growth firms earn lower subsequent returns. Thus, there should be a negative relation between 
forecasted long-term growth and subsequent implied risk premium. Gebhardt et al. (2001) also 
hypothesize a negative association between growth and risk premium. However, it should be 
noted that analysts may be optimistic about future earnings, but as long as they use the correct 
discount rate, their optimism will lead to an inflated price rather than overstated risk premium. 
Gode and Mohanram (2003), Dhaliwal et al. (2006) and Guedhami and Mishra (2009) predict a 
positive effect of growth on cost of equity estimates. The argument is that high-growth firms are 
generally perceived as risky, hence the positive relationship between growth and risk premium. 
We measure Growth as the mean long-term earnings growth rate from I/B/E/S and expect a posi-
tive relationship with the cost of equity. 
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4.7. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the cost of equity capital estimates using the 
four models. We use industry-year averages across the Fama and French 48 Industry Classifica-
tion between 1990 and 2006 that results in 679 total observations. Consistent with the findings in 
recent research (Hail and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006) the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
model (   ) provides on average the highest estimate for the cost of equity 13.46% as opposed to 
the model of Gebhardt et al. (2001) (    ) which gives the lowest estimate, 8.53%.     is also 
the estimate with highest standard deviation: 2.33%. 
The mean industry average annual cost of equity based on all four models (    ) over the 
sample period is 11.3% with standard deviation of 1.85%. For the purpose of our analysis we use 
the implied risk premium (     , which equals the industry year-average cost of equity estimate 
       minus the risk free rate (3-month US Treasury Bill) measured in June of each year (Hail 
and Leuz, 2006; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Mamun and Mishra, 2010). The average implied risk 
premium in our sample is 7.36% with a standard deviation of 2.08%.  
Panel B of Table 1 provides pair-wise correlations between the cost of equity estimates. 
The correlation between the four measures ranges from 35.6% to 98.79%. This is quite high cor-
relation, as pointed out by Guay, Kothari and Shu (2003), is due to the fact that all four models 
rely on the same inputs such as stock price and analysts’ earnings forecasts and use the same 
technique of discounted cash flow valuation models. The average of the four models      has the 
highest correlation with Easton’s estimate (   ) and the lowest with    . 
Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations of the main tests 
and control variables. The industry sample breakdown is summarized in Table 4. The R
2
 from 
the market model regressions for each industry are, as expected, generally pretty low ranging 
from 0.06 to 0.22. SYNCH is therefore negative and it varies in the same direction as R
2
 esti-
mated from the market model regressions from each industry, meaning low    industries also 
have low SYNCH and vice versa. The industry with the best information environment (measured 
by the lowest SYNCH) is the Precious Metals industry, whereas the industry with the worst in-
formation availability to investors is Communication. 
The table also identifies the high-tech, unique, and competitive industries in our sample. 
The values for unique and competitive industries range between 0 and 1 because an industry is 
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classified as unique/competitive based on calculations each year and the table presents averages 
over the whole sample. 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section we test our hypotheses by estimating several specifications of the following basic 
model: 
                                   =                              .                                        (5.1) 
Table 5 reports our main results. In each model we use industry average implied cost of equity 
premium      as our dependent variable. All models include controls that have been suggested 
by the literature as significant determinants of a firm’s cost of equity – industry level averages 
for Fama and French three risk factors: bMKT, bSMB, bHML; leverage, growth and earnings 
forecast variability. Our test variable in Model 1 through Model 11 is SENTIMENT – natural 
logarithm of the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index. 
In Model 1 we see that the coefficient on SENTIMENT is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at 1% level, suggesting that investor optimism is associated with a lower industry aver-
age risk premium. This significant relationship remains when we include the control variables 
previously discussed (Model 2) and supports the expected negative relationship between market-
wide investor sentiment and industry cost of equity proposed in Hypothesis 1. This finding is in 
line with previous research that finds sentiment affecting expected returns (Brown and Cliff, 
2004; Wurgler and Zharavskaya, 2002; Baker and Wurgler, 2005, 2006). More specifically, our 
results suggest that overly optimistic/pessimistic attitude in the market has an impact not only on 
expected cash flows, but investors also adjust the discount rate they use for valuating certain 
stocks in correspondence with their sentiment. As a result, we observe that overvaluation due to 
market’s general positive attitude leads to lower risk premiums, whereas prevailing pessimism 
among investors results in undervaluation or subsequent higher risk premiums.  
As far as the controls, only bHML, leverage and growth appear to be significant and they 
show with the expected positive sign. Since we perceive sentiment as a market wide risk, one 
possible concern is that market risk, measured by beta (bMKT), can absorb the sentiment effect. 
However in our case, the bMKT coefficient is not statistically different from zero, whereas sen-
timent is highly significant. This significance might be due to a relationship between sentiment 
and the general systematic risk in the market. However, the correlation between sentiment 
(SENTIMENT) and market risk (bMKT) is -0.072 (not statistically significant), so they appear to 
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measure different effects, and we needn’t be concerned with multi-collinearity issues between 
them.  
In Hypothesis 2 we predict that competitive industries are more susceptible to investor 
optimism/pessimism, hence, the effect of sentiment on cost of equity should be more pronounced 
for industries with lower concentration. In order to test these predictions, we regress cost of eq-
uity on the interaction between SENTIMENT and a dummy variable identifying competitive in-
dustries (COMPETITIVE). Ideally, the model should include both the interaction term as well as 
the dummy variable for competitive industries. However, due to the high correlation between the 
two, we have to test their effect on sentiment separately.  
In Model 3 the strong negative relationship between cost of equity and sentiment re-
mains. However, the coefficient for COMPETITIVE is not statistically different from zero. This 
does not support previous empirical findings about the negative relationship between market 
concentration and capital cost. Hou and Robinson (2006) show that competitive industries are 
riskier and have higher expected returns even after controlling for size, book to market ratio and 
momentum. However, the main goal of our paper is to test the effect of sentiment, therefore we 
are more interested in the interaction term between sentiment and industry competition 
(S COMPETITIVE). If the effect of sentiment on industry risk premium is stronger for com-
petitive industries, we expect the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative. In other 
words, as firms in competitive industries are found to be more volatile, less liquid and associated 
with greater information uncertainty (Gaspar and Massa, 2006; Peress, 2010), they are expected 
to be affected by sentiment to a greater extent since these are the types of firms subject to specu-
lation and lack of objective valuation. In Model 4 we find that the coefficient for the interaction 
term S COMPETITIVE is not statistically significant suggesting that sentiment has no marginal 
effect for competitive industries and we reject Hypothesis 2. 
Next, we examine the effect of sentiment on product uniqueness. Firms with highly spe-
cialized products can be thought of as intrinsically speculative stocks. Since they don’t have di-
rect substitutes, this makes their valuation highly subjective and uncertain. In the behavioural 
framework, this means that these would be the type of stocks most subject to investor overreac-
tions. Another theoretical argument of our Hypothesis 3 is provided by Aspara and Tikkanen 
(2008) who argue that since individual investors (who are identified with noise traders) are also 
consumers in the product markets, attitudes toward certain products are shifted over to the firm 
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producer, which in turn affects the tendency of these individuals to hold/buy stocks of the same 
companies and individuals’ expectations about these firms’ performance.  
From our sample breakdown by industry (Table 4), we notice that many unique industries 
actually belong to the consumer goods and services sector, for example Candy and Soda, Beer 
and Liquor, Tobacco Products, Recreation, Consumer goods, Apparel and Retail.
9
 The other 
group that can be identified among the unique industries are the high tech industries, (which we 
also examine separately).  
Therefore, as Hypothesis 3 states, we expect the marginal effect of investor sentiment to 
be higher for unique industries. Similarly to our tests for the competitive industries, we examine 
the effect of unique industries on cost of equity by including only a dummy identifying unique 
industries (UNIQUE), as well as focus on the marginal effect of sentiment on this type of indus-
tries since these two variables are highly correlated. Model 6 includes our sentiment proxy SEN-
TIMENT, the interaction term S UNIQUE and controls. The coefficient of the interaction term 
is statistically significant at 5% and indicates that the cost of equity associated with sentiment 
increases for industries classified as unique, which supports Hypothesis 3. 
However, when we test the general effect of unique industries on cost of equity in Model 
5, we find that the coefficient of UNIQUE is negative and statistically significant at 5%. This 
suggests that unique industries exhibit a lower cost of equity, which contradicts our expectations. 
The intuitive interpretation is that as unique industries are hard to value objectively, investors 
might perceive them as riskier and might require higher returns on their investment. Contrary to 
this logic, we find a significant negative relationship between unique industries and the corre-
sponding industry cost of equity. 
One possible explanation for this finding might be that certain industries that we classify 
as unique might actually operate in a monopolistic/oligopolistic market, which means that they 
have higher market power. In this case, unique industries might be thought of as the opposite of 
competitive industries. In this case our results support the literature as Hou and Robinson (2006) 
find that investors require a lower rate of return for high concentration industries because they 
are less exposed to distress risk. Nevertheless, this argument fails to explain why unique indus-
tries are subject to sentiment to a greater extent since market power is associated with less vola-
tility and more information about the firm/industry (Perres, 2010).  
                                                          
9
 It might be surprising that consumer goods would be considered “unique,” but this may be related to brand loyalty. 
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Another sector that deserves special attention is the high-tech industries. Our classifica-
tion of high-tech industries is based on Grullon et al. (2010). In our sample high-tech industries 
are: Electrical Equipment, Communication, Computers, Electronic Equipment and Measuring 
and Control Equipment. More than half of the high-tech industries are also classified as unique, 
which as discussed above, are expected to be more susceptible to sentiment and our results sup-
ported this. Moreover, high-tech industries consist of growth firms, investor sentiment literature 
considers as prone to investor misevaluation. Lastly, the history of financial markets has a clear 
evidence of investor speculation over the high-tech sector. In the late 1990s technology stocks 
were subject to a lot of speculation as at that time technology companies were perceived to have 
great growth opportunities, whereas their stock valuation was not straightforward. Cooper et al. 
(2001) find evidence that companies that included “dot.com” or “dot.net” to their names during 
the internet bubble experienced increase in their stock price as great as 74% even though no 
other feature of the business was altered. As opposed to this trend, in the 2000s during the bear 
market, companies that removed those abbreviations from their names realized gains. This is a 
clear example of how prevailing emotions impact the stock market. 
Based on this evidence, we expect to find that firms operating in the high technology in-
dustries are perceived as riskier by investors, and subject to noise traders’ overreaction. Overall, 
we document no additional perceived risk associated with high tech industries and no marginal 
effect of sentiment on these industries.  
We previously showed that unique industries consist mainly of consumer goods and ser-
vices, as well as high-tech industries. Since, we find no evidence that sentiment affects high-tech 
industries to a greater extent, the more pronounced effect of investor overreaction on unique in-
dustries could be driven entirely by consumers and their perceptions formed in the product mar-
kets.  
As far as the controls in our models, the coefficient of the systematic market risk proxy 
bMKT is positive but it is not statistically different from zero. A weak or no relationship between 
cost of equity and market beta is documented by other studies such as Gebhardt et al. (2001). 
The second Fama and French risk factor is bHML, which similarly to the book to market equity 
ratio, reflects growth opportunities or perceived risk. The coefficient of bHML is positive and 
statistically significant at 5%, which is in line with previous findings in the implied cost of equity 
literature. Gode and Mohanram (2003) and Hail and Luiz (2006) find a positive effect of the raw 
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book to market equity ratio on firm’s cost of equity. Similarly, the positive relation is observed 
by Dhaliwal et al. (2006) using the Fama and French risk loading bHML. The third risk factor 
bSMB is our proxy for firm size, which is associated with information availability; hence we ex-
pect a positive effect of size on the equity risk premium. The coefficient does load with a posi-
tive sign; however, it is not statistically significant in either of the models. LEVERAGE and 
GROW appear statistically significant with the expected positive sign through Model 1 to Model 
8 in Table 5. COEFVAR has statistically significant effect on the risk premium in all models ex-
cept for Model 5 and Model 6. However, the coefficient is statistically significant only at 10%. 
Since speculation and stock misevaluation has a lot to do with lack of information about 
the firm/industry in question, we want to explore how information availability influences senti-
ment effects. Following recent literature that relates idiosyncratic variation to the level of infor-
mation availability (Roll, 1988, Morck et al., 2000, Durnev et al., 2003), we use SYNCH as a 
measure for industry information quality. 
Hypothesis 4 proposes that the effect of investor sentiment on cost of equity is more pro-
nounced for industries with higher information asymmetry. In order to test this, we use interac-
tion terms between sentiment and our synchronicity measure SYNCH. Our main results are pre-
sented in Table 5B.  
Higher SYNCH implies less industry specific information (Durnev et al., 2004). Less in-
dustry specific information means that when investors valuate these industries, they rely more on 
the market risk as a whole because of lack of specific information about the industries in particu-
lar. As a result, market risk has greater weight in pricing these industries. Since sentiment is con-
sidered to be a systematic risk, then it should have greater effect on industries that move with 
greater synchronicity with the market.  
In order to test this, we focus on the marginal effect of sentiment on risk premium in in-
dustries with different levels of information asymmetry (Table 5B).
10
  
First we separate our sample into two: industries above the median SYNCH for the whole 
sample, and industries below the median. This way, the industries with above the median 
SYNCH can be thought of industries with low information availability, whereas below the me-
dian SYNCH industries are thought to have more industry-specific information available to in-
                                                          
10
 Mishra and Shrestha (2010) examine the relationship between information availability measured in a manner that 
is inverse of our measure of synchronicity and cost of equity estimates derived from ex ante valuation models and 
find that cost of equity is a negative function of information availability. 
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vestors We would expect industries with lower SYNCH and higher industry specific variation to 
be less affected by sentiment. On the other hand, since high SYNCH industries are associated 
with worse information environment; they will be more susceptible to mispricing caused by the 
prevailing investor sentiment in the market. 
In Model 9 (Table 5B) we use an interaction term between SENTIMENT and a dummy 
identifying industries with low SYNCH (LOW). The general effect of sentiment on industry risk 
premium is -0.0484 and it is statistically significant at 1%. The coefficient of S LAW is also 
negative and statistically significant. This evidence suggests that the effect of sentiment is 
stronger for industries with lower synchronicity, which contradicts our theoretical argument that 
if there is more industry-specific information in the market, proxied by low SYNCH, the valua-
tion of the firms operating in these industries will be more straightforward, less subject to specu-
lative mispricing and, therefore, these industries will be less affected by the overall market sen-
timent. In other words, if SYNCH indeed measures information asymmetry, our results suggest 
that industries with higher information asymmetry experience less mispricing due to investor op-
timism/pessimism. 
In order to provide a more thorough analysis about the differences in the effect of senti-
ment across different levels of information quality, we sort our sample on market synchronicity 
(SYNCH) and divide it into quintiles. Models 10 – 14 respectively include an interaction term 
between a dummy for each one of the quintiles of SYNCH and SENTIMENT. We find suppor-
tive evidence of what we observed in Model 9 – the misvaluation due to investors’ overreaction 
is more pronounced for industries with low market synchronicity. The marginal effect of senti-
ment associated with the bottom quintile of SYNCH is -0.0013 and statistically significant at 1% 
(Model 10). We find no evidence that sentiment has any marginal effect for industries with high 
SYNCH (quintiles 4 and 5). However, we do find that sentiment has more pronounced effect on 
cost of equity for industries with medium synchronicity (Model 12).  
Since we hypothesize that the impact of sentiment on cost of equity should be different 
depending on whether industries are identified as competitive, unique and having good informa-
tion environment, our models should ideally include SENTIMENT, an intercept dummy (identi-
fying the respective industry feature) and a slope dummy (the interaction between sentiment and 
a dummy for competitive, unique and high market synchronicity industries). However, the indus-
try features dummies and the corresponding interaction terms are highly correlated. For example, 
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the correlation between LOW and S LOW is 99.95%. We should note that this high correlation 
is expected given the low variation of our sentiment proxy. On one hand, omitting the dummy 
variable LOW we might be forcing the interaction term to explain more than it actually does. On 
the other hand, including both terms would cause multicollinearity issues in the regression mod-
els. That is the reason why we test the slope and the intercept dummies separately, and this is one 
of the limitations of our study. 
In addition, we should note that our results are heavily affected by the interpretation of 
SYNCH as a proxy for the information environment. Roll (1988) suggests that low R
2
 from the 
market model is potentially due to firm’s returns capturing unique firm-specific information or 
reflecting greater idiosyncratic noise. Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2003) and a number of 
other studies reject the notion that idiosyncratic volatility is caused by noise traders and attribute 
it to trading activities of informed arbitrageurs.  
Interpreting low SYNCH as a measure of good information availability is plausible in a 
market with no frictions and rational investors. Then price equals fundamental values and stock 
volatility would reflect new information incorporated in the price. However, in the framework of 
behavioural finance, agents are irrational and subject to sentiment. Therefore behavioural biases, 
bubbles, momentum, herding and other non-fundamental factors could affect stock return volatil-
ity (Barberis et al., 2005). As a result, our synchronicity measure might capture other market fac-
tors along with the firm-specific information.  
For example, volatility in the market might be due to institutional herding, which does 
not necessarily lead to new information in the market. Neither is it associated with prevailing 
noise trader sentiment. Lee (1992) shows that institutional investors tend to trade in larger vol-
umes than individual investors, which may induce greater volatility. It is also argued that institu-
tional investors are more susceptible to herding behaviour because of the interrelated nature of 
the institutional investor community, the competition for better performance among them, and 
lastly, the asymmetry of incentives. In other words, the losses caused by underperformance are 
greater than the gains from overperformance. Such herding may aggravate price movements and 
increase volatility (Sias, 1996). 
An opposing view to that proposed by Morck et al. (2000) is that market synchronicity is 
increasing in the quality of the information environment. Kelly (2007, p.31) finds empirical evi-
dence that a low market synchronicity environment is actually characterized by “lower institu-
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tional holdings, lower breadth of institutional ownership, lower analyst coverage, higher trans-
actions costs, lower liquidity, greater private information risk, fewer information events, and a 
lower flow of informed trades.” Consistent with this finding, Evans (2010) finds that firms with 
lower synchronicity are predominantly traded by individual investors. Her study shows that 
higher levels of trading by retail investors result in more firm-specific return variation and this 
relationship is more pronounced for smaller firms. Evans (2010) also finds that this negative re-
lationship between retail trading volume and synchronicity remains significant for firms in indus-
tries that are generally more sensitive to the overall market conditions (such as finance and con-
struction).  
Since retail investors are identified with noise traders, sentiment should affect mainly 
stocks traded/held by these individual investors. Based on the findings of Evans (2010), these 
would be the firms with lower SYNCH. The sign of the interaction terms in Models 9 and 10 
(Table 5) support this notion. We found a stronger marginal effect of sentiment for low SYNCH 
industries and no marginal effect of sentiment for industries with higher SYNCH. 
Similarly to the models in Table 5A, bHML, leverage and growth seem to be consistently 
significant and have positive signs, as expected, in all three models. However, earnings variabil-
ity (COEFVAR) is significant for all models with significance of 10%. 
One could argue that adding a measure for information availability while keeping a con-
trol for information availability (bSMB) is redundant. However, even though size is often con-
sidered as a proxy for information asymmetry between a company and investors, it captures a 
number of other risk characteristics (e.g. firm’s earnings stability, liquidity, associated risk) and 
it is important to be considered when examining cost of equity. Market synchronicity, on the 
other hand, captures idiosyncratic volatility that is nominated by the literature as a proxy of firm 
specific information being incorporated in the price. Moreover, based on the descriptive statis-
tics, the correlation of size and market synchronicity is 10% so we are not concerned with collin-
earity issues. 
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CHAPTER 6 
          ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
6.1.One Way Industry Fixed Effects 
 
Since we study a panel of industry average cost of equity capital from 1990 to 2006, using an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression might provide a biased estimator. The common solu-
tion is a fixed effects model. Even though this is the common practice in studies using multi-
dimensional data, in our case our main test variable – sentiment – varies only across years but 
not across industries. Therefore including year fixed effects is not applicable. A one-way indus-
try fixed effects is reasonable, although one concern is that much of the cross-industry variation 
would be eliminated and this is exactly what our focus is on - the effect of sentiment across in-
dustries. However, in order to be thorough and test whether our results are robust we use industry 
fixed effects. So, our model has the following specification: 
     =                                                       .  
                                                                                                                                                    (6.1) 
These results are presented in Tables 6A and 6B. We replicate the main models from Ta-
bles 5A and 5B. In sum, the strong negative relationship between sentiment and implied risk 
premium remains throughout all models (coefficient of SENTIMENT is significant at 1%). In 
Models 5 and 6 of Table 6A we see that the effect of unique industries has disappeared. Com-
petitive industries dummy as well as the interaction term with sentiment have no explanatory 
power, similar to our results using OLS estimates.  
The marginal effect of sentiment for high-tech industries appears to be statistically sig-
nificant at 5% and carrying the expected negative sign. As we hypothesized high-tech industries 
are easier to speculate with because of their high growth opportunities and the specialized nature 
of their product. However, this result is not significant when using OLS without industry fixed 
effects. 
Hypothesis 4 is tested in models 8 to 10. While the coefficients of our synchronicity 
proxy and the corresponding interaction terms with sentiment were highly significant in the OLS 
regressions (1%), here they are not statistically different from zero. 
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6.2. Raw Cost of Equity as a Dependent Variable 
 
Our choice of implied risk premium as a dependent variable is in line with recent studies incor-
porating ex ante valuation models (Dhaliwal et al., 2006, Hail and Luiz, 2006, El Ghoul et al., 
2011). However, we conduct our tests using the cost of equity estimates (without subtracting the 
risk-free rate) instead in order to see whether the results are robust. Table 7 shows that the coef-
ficient for sentiment is still negative and statistically significant. All four hypotheses previously 
tested are supported by these results as well. The major difference is in the significance of the 
control variables. Here, as opposed to the models using risk premium as dependent variable, the 
proxy for systematic risk (bMKT) is significant but appears with negative sign, suggesting that 
higher market risk lowers industry average cost of equity. bHML is no longer significant. On the 
other hand, bSMB, which previously showed to have no effect of risk premium, now has highly 
statistically significant coefficient estimate with the predicted positive sign. Leverage and 
growth, similarly to that in our main models, have significant positive effect on cost of equity. 
 
6.3.Lagged Sentiment 
 
As mispricing is hard to identify directly, the general approach is to look for systematic patters of 
correction of mispricing (Baker and Wurgler, 2006). For example, current optimism among in-
vestors results in overvaluation, so future returns would be lower as the market price reverts to 
its intrinsic value. This ex post evidence of mispricing is over different time horizons, ranging 
from 1 month to 3 years (Brown and Cliff, 2005, Schmeling, 2009). Since we deal with annual 
data, we use same period sentiment and cost of equity estimates for our main tests as 12 months 
is usually considered a long enough period for correction of mispricing to take place. However, 
we also test whether lagged period sentiment still has significant effect over expected returns. 
Table 8 presents the empirical results of regressing equity risk premium in year t on sentiment in 
t - 1 with controls.  
The negative relationship between sentiment and cost of equity remains significant in all 
model specifications. Sentiment does not have a marginal effect on cost of equity capital for 
competitive industries similar to our main findings, whereas lagged sentiment is more pro-
nounced for industries with unique products. The interaction term between lagged sentiment and 
our information availability proxy – SYNCH, is still positive and significant but only at 10%. If 
we test the effect of sentiment on low/high synchronicity industries separately, however, the sig-
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nificance disappears. The coefficient associated with the effect of sentiment in high-tech indus-
tries is with the expected negative sign but it is not statistically different from zero. 
 
6.4. Sentiment Measured in June 
 
Cost of equity estimates are measured as of June in each year, while the sentiment measure is an 
average over all 12 months for the respective year. So the time alignment of our variables might 
cause some issues. For example, the prevailing sentiment at the time analysts make their forecast 
could be more relevant than the one that represents the general attitudes over the year. In order to 
test whether our results are robust, we repeat our analysis this time using the natural logarithm of 
the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index in June for each year in our sample. The results are 
presented in Table 9. The coefficients of sentiment are a little larger in magnitude but still have a 
negative sign and are highly significant. The significance and signs of the rest of the test vari-
ables are comparable to our main test in Table 5. The only difference is regarding Hypothesis 4 
since the interaction terms between sentiment and industry synchronicity are not significant.  
 
6.5. Alternative Sentiment Proxy 
 
Since our results might be affected by our choice of the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index 
as an investor sentiment proxy, we adopt an alternative sentiment measure based on sentiment 
theory and relying on financial market data.  We take Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) composite in-
dex consisting of six different proxies proposed by different studies and shown to be associated 
with asset prices: value-weighted dividend premium (Baker and Wurgler, 2004), IPO volume 
(Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter, 1994), closed-end fund discount (Neal and Wheatley, 1998), eq-
uity share in new issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2000), and NYSE turnover (NYSE Factbook). 
Most of them are based on the premise that sentiment is spread in the market through the trading 
activities of retail investors. 
In Table 10 we have replicated our main models, this time using Baker and Wurgler’s in-
dex (SENT) as a sentiment proxy. We find again that the sentiment coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant. The only model where sentiment has no explanatory power is Model 8 
that includes also an interaction term between sentiment and synchronicity. We do find a signifi-
cant negative relationship for unique industries in Model 4, but no marginal effect of sentiment 
associated with this type of industries (Model 5).  
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The interaction terms between the composite index SENT and the overall information 
environment SYNCH, and the dummies for low and high SYNH industries respectively are not 
statistically different from zero. The regressions testing the effect of high-tech industries show 
similar results as our main tests – expected negative sign but no significance. The significant 
negative effect of sentiment (SENT) on equity risk premium is robust to adding industry fixed 
effects to the models. 
 
6.6.Using the Four Cost of Equity Estimates Individually 
 
We also run the main regressions using the four cost of equity estimates (Claus and Thomas, 
2001; Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Gebhardt et al, 2001; and Easton, 2004) separately as 
dependant variables. Results are presented in Tables 11 - 14. The negative relationship between 
SENTIMENT and cost of equity holds for all models except for the estimates based on Gebhardt 
et al. (2001). Table 14 shows that when we use kGLS , the coefficient of SENTIMENT is actually 
positive but it is not statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
used to test the rest of the hypotheses appear to be statistically insignificant. The only exception 
is regarding Hypothesis 4 as the coefficient of S SYNCH is negative and significant just as in 
our main results. 
When we use the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and Easton (2004) estimates we 
find significant marginal effect of sentiment in competitive industries. However, as opposed to 
our expectations, the effect of investors’ overreaction seem to be less pronounced in this type of 
industries. 
We find robust results about Hypotheses 3 and 4 across the models. However, when we 
use the cost of equity estimate derived from Claus and Thomas (2001) model, we don’t find sup-
porting evidence that the effect of sentiment on cost of equity varies across industries with dif-
ferent information availability. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
The existing literature suggests that retail investor sentiment is an omitted risk factor in standard 
asset pricing models. However, there is no clear evidence yet whether the effect of sentiment de-
rives from expected cash flows or discount rates. Therefore, our research aims to test the effect 
of noise traders on the cost of equity using forward-looking valuation models and to see whether 
these effects vary across industries. 
We find a strong negative relationship between sentiment and industry average cost of 
equity robust to different model specifications and sentiment proxies. We find no significant 
marginal effect of sentiment in competitive industries. However, when examining industries with 
highly specialized products, we observe that on average these industries are affected to a greater 
extent by the prevailing sentiment in the market. 
Furthermore, we try to relate the impact of sentiment with different information environ-
ments across the Fama-French 48 industries. We observe a stronger sentiment effect for indus-
tries with low market synchronicity suggesting that higher industry specific volatility is associ-
ated with more pronounced misvaluation triggered by excessive optimism/pessimism by the 
noise traders.  
This study makes several contributions to the existing literature in the field of behav-
ioural finance. First, the empirical tests rely on forward looking estimates of cost of equity, 
which supposedly perform better and deal with many of the flaws related to using average real-
ized returns. Second, even though the effect of sentiment on asset mispricing has been broadly 
explored, we address this question through new perspective, offering evidence that certain fea-
tures of the product markets in which firms operate influence the effect of investor sentiment on 
industry cost of equity. Lastly, we add to the literature exploring market synchronicity by testing 
the marginal effect of sentiment associated with it. 
As in all empirical work, our study has a number of limitations, which should be noted. 
First, because of the nature of the cost of equity estimates we are limited in our choice of data 
frequency. We conduct our analysis using annual data and this way we cannot explore more 
closely when the effect of sentiment takes place in time and how persistent this mispricing is. 
Second, we lack a direct measure of both the dependent variable as well as the main test variable. 
We have adopted a survey proxy, which requires the assumption that the respondents (US 
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households) are identified with the individual investors who introduce noise in the capital mar-
ket.  
When we incorporate sentiment into asset valuation, there are a number of channels 
through which market overreaction could impact the required rate of return: amount of risk, price 
of risk, risk aversion, loss aversion, cognitive and emotional biases and of course the interaction 
of all of the above. The scope of our study is limited to the aggregate level of sentiment in the 
market, perceived as an omitted systematic risk factor and its effect on industry-average cost of 
capital. A more intrinsic decomposition and analysis of all factors contributing to investor senti-
ment in the capital market we will leave to future research. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Implied Cost of Capital Estimates 
 
Panel A: Distributional statistics for the cost of capital estimates 
  
    
Percentile 
  Variable N Mean Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max StDev 
    679 0.105539 0.054638 0.090539 0.104845 0.117455 0.363334 0.022234 
     679 0.085307 0.02463 0.074184 0.083557 0.092995 0.245375 0.019544 
    679 0.134625 0.069739 0.117155 0.131975 0.146874 0.255687 0.024672 
    679 0.126918 0.070469 0.110921 0.123089 0.138147 0.251191 0.023291 
     679 0.113097 0.067213 0.099389 0.111798 0.123389 0.203525 0.018463 
         
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients between cost of capital estimates 
 
         
Variable 
  
                      
        1 
           0.9068 1 
          0.9112 0.9879 1 
         0.7852 0.5546 0.5373 1 
         0.6548 0.356 0.3932 0.4888 1 
    
This table reports descriptive statistics for the cost of equity estimates based on four models: Claus and Thomas (   ), 
Gebhardt et al. (    ), Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth       and Easton     ).       is the mean of the four estimates. 
The full sample consists of 679 industry-year averages across Fama and French 48 Industries in the period between 
1990 and 2006. All correlation coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Test and Control Variables 
 
    
Percentile 
  
Variable N Mean Min Q1 Q2 Q3 Max Stdev 
SENTIMENT 679 4.52 4.30 4.50 4.50 4.60 4.70 0.11 
SENTBW 679 0.07 -1.00 -0.18 -0.02 0.15 1.92 0.64 
LEVERAGE 679 0.38 0.07 0.30 0.38 0.46 0.94 0.13 
COEFVAR 679 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.14 3.34 0.21 
GROW 679 16.39 3.75 13.18 15.56 19.37 44.58 5.11 
bMKT 679 0.90 -63.30 0.79 1.01 1.20 3.55 2.52 
bHML 679 0.17 -9.98 -0.14 0.25 0.50 7.09 0.87 
bSMB 679 0.59 -18.46 0.29 0.60 0.91 6.37 0.97 
   679 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.14 0.18 0.37 0.06 
SYNCH 679 -1.84 -3.51 -2.17 -1.86 -1.52 -0.46 0.48 
LOW 679 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 0.50 
HIGH 679 0.50 0 0 0 1 1 0.50 
HIGH_TECH 679 0.12 0 0 0 0 1 0.33 
S x HIGH_TECH 679 0.56 0 0 0 0 4.70 1.49 
UNIQUE 679 0.29 0 0 0 1 1 0.45 
COMPETITIVE 679 0.25 0 0 0 0 1 0.43 
S x UNIQUE 679 1.30 0 0 0 4.40 4.70 2.05 
S x COMPETITIVE 679 1.11 0 0 0 0 4.70 1.95 
S x LOW 679 2.28 0 0 4.30 4.50 4.70 2.28 
S x HIGH 679 2.24 0 0 0 4.50 4.70 2.25 
S x SYNCH 679 -8.33 -15.83 -9.84 -8.38 -6.73 -2.04 2.22 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the main test variables as well as controls. These are annual observa-
tions in the period between 1990 and 2006. SENTIMENT and SENTBW are our sentiment measures proxied by the 
Michigan Consumer Confidence Index and Baker and Wurgler’s composite index, respectively. bMKT, bHML and 
bSML are Fama and French risk factors. Together with leverage (LEVERAGE), earnings variability (COEFVAR) 
and long-term growth (GROW) they represent our control variables. R
2
 refers to the R-squared statistics from the 
market models run for each industry based on the Fama and French 48 industry classification. SYNCH stands for 
industry synchronicity measure. LOW and HIGH are dummies for below and above the median industry SYNCH 
respectively. UNIQUE is a dummy variable for unique industries, whereas COMPETITIVE refers to competitive 
industries dummy. HIGH_TECH is a dummy identifying high-tech industries. S x HIGH_TECH, S x UNIQUE, S x 
COMPETITIVE, S x LOW, S x HIGH and S x SYNCH represent interaction terms between the Michigan Con-
sumer Sentiment Index and the respective industry characteristic. For a detailed description of the variables refer to 
Appendix A. 
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LEVERAGE 1.000
COEFVAR -0.032 1.000
GROW -0.541 0.005 1.000
bMKT 0.012 -0.098 0.063 1.000
bHML 0.233 0.015 -0.167 0.044 1.000
bSMB -0.120 -0.022 0.178 0.750 0.239 1.000
SENTIMENT 0.098 -0.032 0.146 -0.072 0.196 -0.018 1.000
SENT 0.086 0.008 0.153 0.010 0.138 0.026 0.585 1.000
UNIQUE -0.413 -0.078 0.247 0.033 -0.212 0.009 0.005 0.007 1.000
COMPETITIVE -0.010 0.011 -0.081 0.050 0.027 0.016 -0.005 -0.003 -0.130 1.000
SYNCH -0.048 -0.081 0.005 0.099 -0.114 0.101 -0.330 -0.339 0.119 0.229 1.000
LOW 0.073 0.039 0.027 -0.076 0.104 -0.062 0.339 0.343 -0.103 -0.221 -0.790 1.000
HIGH -0.073 -0.039 -0.027 0.076 -0.104 0.062 -0.339 -0.343 0.103 0.221 0.790 -1.000 1.000
HIGH_TECH -0.328 0.037 0.258 0.054 -0.132 0.095 -0.004 0.000 0.274 0.055 0.198 -0.178 0.178 1.000
S x HIGHTECH -0.328 0.037 0.261 0.054 -0.131 0.096 0.005 0.005 0.274 0.057 0.197 -0.176 0.176 1.000 1.000
S x UNIQUE -0.412 -0.079 0.248 0.032 -0.208 0.009 0.021 0.016 1.000 -0.128 0.113 -0.097 0.097 0.274 0.274 1.000
S x COMPETITIVE -0.010 0.010 -0.078 0.050 0.029 0.017 0.009 0.005 -0.128 1.000 0.224 -0.217 0.217 0.057 0.058 -0.126 1.000
S x LOW 0.077 0.037 0.029 -0.077 0.108 -0.063 0.358 0.356 -0.102 -0.220 -0.788 1.000 -1.000 -0.178 -0.176 -0.096 -0.216 1.000
S x HIGH -0.073 -0.039 -0.023 0.075 -0.100 0.063 -0.315 -0.333 0.104 0.224 0.785 -0.999 0.999 0.181 0.179 0.099 0.220 -0.999 1.000
S x SYNCH -0.059 -0.075 -0.007 0.104 -0.128 0.101 -0.410 -0.383 0.114 0.223 0.996 -0.796 0.796 0.195 0.193 0.108 0.216 -0.797 0.790 1
Table 3
Correlation Table
 
 
 
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables. The coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. Please  
refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 4.  
Sample Breakdown by Industry 
 
No Industry R
2
 SYNCH ravg High Tech Unique Competitive 
1 Agriculture 0.12 -2.10 0.07 0 0 0 
2 Food Products 0.11 -2.16 0.06 0 0 0 
3 Candy & Soda 0.19 -1.53 0.06 0 1 0 
4 Beer & Liquor 0.14 -1.96 0.05 0 1 0 
5 Tobacco Products 0.13 -2.20 0.10 0 0.64 0 
6 Recreation 0.13 -1.92 0.08 0 1 0 
7 Entertainment 0.13 -1.92 0.07 0 0 0 
8 Printing & Publishing 0.18 -1.59 0.06 0 1 0.35 
9 Consumer Goods 0.16 -1.72 0.07 0 1 0 
10 Apparel 0.13 -2.01 0.08 0 0.41 0.12 
11 Healthcare 0.12 -2.09 0.07 0 0 0.06 
12 Medical Equipment 0.11 -2.10 0.06 0 1 0.18 
13 Pharmaceutical Products 0.14 -1.87 0.06 0 0.41 0.06 
14 Chemicals 0.17 -1.60 0.07 0 0 0.35 
15 Rubber & Plastic Products 0.13 -1.98 0.07 0 0 0.13 
16 Textiles 0.12 -2.11 0.10 0 0 0.27 
17 Construction materials 0.15 -1.75 0.08 0 0 0.59 
18 Construction  0.14 -1.87 0.09 0 0 0.06 
19 Steel Works 0.19 -1.50 0.10 0 0 1 
20 Fabricated Products 0.12 -1.99 0.09 0 0 0 
21 Machinery 0.16 -1.71 0.08 0 0 1 
22 Electrical Equipment 0.15 -1.75 0.07 1 0 0 
23 Automobiles & Trucks 0.18 -1.56 0.09 0 0 0 
24 Aircraft 0.14 -1.92 0.07 0 0 0 
25 Shipbuilding & Railroad Equipment 0.15 -1.76 0.08 0 0 0 
26 Defence 0.14 -1.86 0.08 0 0 0 
27 Precious Metals 0.06 -2.76 0.06 0 0 0 
28 Non-Metallic & Ind Metal Mining 0.12 -2.00 0.07 0 0 0 
29 Coal 0.17 -1.67 0.11 0 0 0 
30 Petroleum & Natural gas 0.11 -2.13 0.08 0 0 0 
31 Utilities 0.13 -2.06 0.06 0 0 1 
32 Communication 0.22 -1.30 0.06 1 0.06 1 
33 Personal Services 0.13 -1.96 0.06 0 0 0 
34 Business Services 0.17 -1.60 0.06 0 1 0.41 
35 Computers 0.16 -1.69 0.07 1 1 0 
36 Electronic Equipment 0.19 -1.49 0.07 1 1 0.53 
37 Measuring & Control Equipment 0.16 -1.72 0.07 1 1 0 
38 Business Supplies 0.19 -1.51 0.09 1 0 0.59 
39 Shipping Containers 0.18 -1.60 0.09 0 0 0 
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40 Transportation 0.16 -1.67 0.08 0 0 1 
41 Wholesale 0.13 -1.92 0.07 0 0 0.06 
42 Retail 0.15 -1.75 0.07 0 0.29 1 
43 Restaurants, Hotels & Motels 0.14 -1.91 0.06 0 0 0.19 
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Table 5A 
Sentiment, Implied Cost of Equity and Industry Characteristics 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES                                         
                  
Constant 0.2545*** 0.2849*** 0.2847*** 0.2851*** 0.2833*** 0.2822*** 0.2849*** 0.2848*** 
 
(8.688) (9.529) (9.518) (9.540) (9.577) (9.541) (9.524) (9.521) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0400*** -0.0536*** -0.0538*** -0.0539*** -0.0526*** -0.0523*** -0.0536*** -0.0536*** 
 
(-6.157) (-7.769) (-7.799) (-7.815) (-7.713) (-7.666) (-7.755) (-7.749) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
0.0018 
     
   
(1.065) 
     S x COMPETITIVE 
   
0.0004 
    
    
(1.060) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0037** 
   
     
(-2.058) 
   S x UNIQUE 
     
-0.0008** 
  
      
(-2.093) 
  HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0003 
 
       
(-0.157) 
 S x HIGH_TECH 
       
-0.0001 
        
(-0.223) 
bMKT 
 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
  
(0.320) (0.258) (0.258) (0.484) (0.489) (0.322) (0.322) 
bHML 
 
0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0026** 0.0026** 0.0028** 0.0028** 
  
(2.462) (2.466) (2.467) (2.338) (2.336) (2.453) (2.450) 
bSMB 
 
0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 
  
(0.182) (0.214) (0.213) (0.068) (0.065) (0.185) (0.187) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0507*** 0.0512*** 0.0512*** 0.0455*** 0.0454*** 0.0504*** 0.0504*** 
  
(6.256) (6.292) (6.291) (5.282) (5.270) (6.064) (6.055) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0082* 0.0081* 0.0081* 0.0075 0.0075 0.0082* 0.0082* 
  
 
5
8 
  
(1.773) (1.768) (1.768) (1.613) (1.609) (1.770) (1.770) 
GROW 
 
0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
  
(2.808) (2.879) (2.878) (2.860) (2.857) (2.824) (2.828) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.044 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.144 0.144 0.138 0.138 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 
1990 to 2006.The dependent variable,     , is the mean of the four estimated models for the implied cost of equity capital minus 
the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENT is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 5B 
Sentiment, Implied Cost of Equity and Synchronicity 
 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
VARIABLES                                     
  
       Constant 0.2626*** 0.2732*** 0.2830*** 0.2936*** 0.2829*** 0.2897*** 0.2829*** 
 
(8.031) (8.999) (9.278) (9.829) (9.319) (9.456) (8.897) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0484*** -0.0506*** -0.0532*** -0.0558*** -0.0532*** -0.0546*** -0.0541*** 
 
(-6.464) (-7.219) (-7.559) (-8.094) (-7.626) (-7.818) (-7.528) 
S x LOW -0.0007** 
      
 
(-2.067) 
      S x QT1 
 
-0.0013*** 
     
  
(-2.788) 
     S x QT2 
  
-0.0001 
   
0.0010* 
   
(-0.329) 
   
(1.767) 
S x QT3 
   
0.0014*** 
  
0.0022*** 
    
(3.580) 
  
(3.838) 
S x QT4 
    
0.0002 
 
0.0012** 
     
(0.555) 
 
(2.190) 
S x QT5 
     
-0.0002 0.0009 
      
(-0.561) (1.527) 
bMKT 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.321) (0.258) (0.325) (0.143) (0.338) (0.312) (0.139) 
bHML 0.0029** 0.0030*** 0.0028** 0.0029** 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0030*** 
 
(2.578) (2.713) (2.456) (2.515) (2.448) (2.436) (2.669) 
bSMB 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.114) (0.063) (0.180) (0.317) (0.159) (0.202) (0.191) 
LEV 0.0511*** 0.0504*** 0.0507*** 0.0506*** 0.0507*** 0.0507*** 0.0504*** 
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(6.229) (6.276) (6.251) (6.389) (6.262) (6.287) (6.404) 
COEFVAR 0.0085* 0.0093** 0.0081* 0.0085* 0.0082* 0.0082* 0.0094** 
 
(1.864) (2.139) (1.760) (1.869) (1.787) (1.771) (2.142) 
GROW 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 
 
(2.846) (2.645) (2.824) (2.803) (2.794) (2.754) (2.633) 
        N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 0.144 0.152 0.138 0.154 0.139 0.139 0.158 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages 
from 1990 to 2006. The dependent variable,     , is the mean of the four estimated models for the implied cost of equity capi-
tal minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENT is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Senti-
ment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * rep-
resent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variables descrip-
tion. 
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Table 6A 
Robustness Tests with Industry Fixed Effects 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES                                    
                
Constant 0.2617*** 0.2810*** 0.2807*** 0.2805*** 0.2808*** 0.2816*** 0.2561*** 
 
(12.107) (12.648) (12.648) (12.630) (12.658) (12.704) (10.738) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0421*** -0.0547*** -0.0546*** -0.0546*** -0.0547*** -0.0549*** -0.0492*** 
 
(-8.823) (-10.398) (-10.370) (-10.342) (-10.400) (-10.417) (-8.733) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
-0.0009 
    
   
(-0.374) 
    S x COMPETITIVE 
   
-0.0002 
   
    
(-0.335) 
   UNIQUE 
    
0.0035 
  
     
(0.777) 
  S x UNIQUE 
     
0.0007 
 
      
(0.654) 
 S x HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0439*** 
       
(-3.205) 
bMKT 
 
0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
  
(1.086) (1.102) (1.100) (1.074) (1.073) (1.001) 
bHML 
 
0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0017 
  
(1.613) (1.588) (1.589) (1.593) (1.594) (1.488) 
bSMB 
 
-0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0025 
  
(-1.664) (-1.672) (-1.671) (-1.647) (-1.648) (-1.566) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0534*** 0.0532*** 0.0532*** 0.0535*** 0.0535*** 0.0512*** 
  
(4.095) (4.045) (4.045) (4.056) (4.062) (3.927) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0119*** 0.0125*** 
  
(2.940) (2.937) (2.937) (2.937) (2.936) (3.076) 
GROW 
 
0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
  
 
6
2 
  
(3.172) (3.150) (3.152) (3.142) (3.147) (3.417) 
        Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 0.361 0.413 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.418 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation with industry dummies. The sample consists 
of 679 industry-year averages from 1990 to 2006. The dependent variable,     , is the mean of the four estimated models 
for the implied cost of equity capital minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENT (S) is the 
natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic 
robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
Refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 6B 
Robustness Tests with Industry Fixed Effects 
 
  (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES                
        
Constant 0.2833*** 0.2727*** 0.2727*** 
 
(10.872) (11.072) (11.072) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0555*** -0.0527*** -0.0530*** 
 
(-8.518) (-8.985) (-9.247) 
S x SYNCH -0.0001 
  
 
(-0.196) 
  S x LOW 
 
-0.0003 
 
  
(-0.898) 
 S x HIGH 
  
0.0003 
   
(0.898) 
bMKT 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 
(1.065) (1.118) (1.118) 
bHML 0.0019 0.0020* 0.0020* 
 
(1.604) (1.667) (1.667) 
bSMB -0.0027* -0.0027* -0.0027* 
 
(-1.650) (-1.702) (-1.702) 
LEVERAGE 0.0534*** 0.0536*** 0.0536*** 
 
(4.069) (4.069) (4.069) 
COEFVAR 0.0119*** 0.0118*** 0.0118*** 
 
(2.928) (2.941) (2.941) 
GROW 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 
 
(3.188) (3.148) (3.148) 
    Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.412 0.412 0.412 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression es-
timation with industry dummies. The sample consists of 679 industry-
year averages from 1990 to 2006. The dependent variable, ravg, is the 
mean of the four estimated models for the implied cost of equity capital 
minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENT 
(S) is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for 
variables description. 
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                                                               Table 7A 
      Robustness Tests with Sentiment and Raw Industry Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES k k k k k k k K 
                  
Constant 0.1961*** 0.2060*** 0.2057*** 0.2062*** 0.2041*** 0.2028*** 0.2058*** 0.2057*** 
 
(6.348) (6.739) (6.733) (6.752) (6.730) (6.686) (6.736) (6.726) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0184*** -0.0268*** -0.0270*** -0.0271*** -0.0256*** -0.0253*** -0.0267*** -0.0267*** 
 
(-2.677) (-3.775) (-3.806) (-3.821) (-3.636) (-3.589) (-3.757) (-3.747) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
0.0021 
     
   
(1.344) 
     S x COMPETITIVE 
   
0.0005 
    
    
(1.326) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0043** 
   
     
(-2.507) 
   S x UNIQUE 
     
-0.0010** 
  
      
(-2.533) 
  HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0011 
 
       
(-0.631) 
 S x HIGH_TECH 
       
-0.0003 
        
(-0.723) 
bMKT 
 
-0.0009* -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0008* -0.0008* -0.0009* -0.0009* 
  
(-1.921) (-2.039) (-2.038) (-1.743) (-1.739) (-1.895) (-1.892) 
bHML 
 
-0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  
(-0.450) (-0.497) (-0.494) (-0.743) (-0.745) (-0.488) (-0.494) 
bSMB 
 
0.0043*** 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0044*** 0.0044*** 
  
(3.881) (3.966) (3.963) (3.779) (3.776) (3.872) (3.874) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0510*** 0.0517*** 0.0517*** 0.0450*** 0.0449*** 0.0503*** 0.0502*** 
  
(7.167) (7.225) (7.223) (5.906) (5.893) (6.920) (6.908) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0052 0.0051 0.0051 0.0045 0.0045 0.0053 0.0053 
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(1.441) (1.439) (1.439) (1.246) (1.243) (1.444) (1.446) 
GROW 
 
0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 0.0004** 
  
(1.974) (2.080) (2.079) (2.017) (2.014) (2.013) (2.018) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.011 0.113 0.114 0.114 0.121 0.121 0.112 0.112 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 
1990 to 2006. The dependent variable, k, is the mean of the four estimated models for the implied cost of equity capital. SENTIMENT (S) 
is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A 
for variables description. 
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Table 7B 
                    Robustness Tests with Sentiment and Raw Industry Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
 
  (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES k k k 
        
Constant 0.1663*** 0.1780*** 0.1780*** 
 
(5.122) (5.475) (5.475) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0152** -0.0202*** -0.0212*** 
 
(-1.969) (-2.687) (-2.852) 
S x SYNCH 0.0014*** 
  
 
(3.399) 
  S x LOW 
 
-0.0009*** 
 
  
(-2.906) 
 S x HIGH 
  
0.0009*** 
   
(2.906) 
bMKT -0.0008** -0.0009** -0.0009** 
 
(-1.993) (-2.024) (-2.024) 
bHML -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(-0.130) (-0.319) (-0.319) 
bSMB 0.0039*** 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
 
(3.524) (3.804) (3.804) 
LEVERAGE 0.0502*** 0.0516*** 0.0516*** 
 
(6.945) (7.162) (7.162) 
COEFVAR 0.0065* 0.0057 0.0057 
 
(1.830) (1.582) (1.582) 
GROW 0.0004* 0.0004** 0.0004** 
 
(1.907) (2.055) (2.055) 
    N 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.136 0.124 0.124 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estima-
tion. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 1990 to 2006. 
The dependent variable, k, is the mean of the four estimated models for the 
implied cost of equity capital. SENTIMENT (S) is the natural log of Michi-
gan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics cal-
culated with heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
Refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 8 
Robustness Tests with Lagged Sentiment and Industry Cost of Equity 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES           
  
                         
      
 
        
Constant 0.1505*** 0.1538*** 0.1493*** 0.1305*** 0.1363*** 0.1363*** 0.1503*** 
 
(4.704) (4.761) (4.653) (3.694) (4.030) (4.030) (4.695) 
LAG_SENTIMENT (S) -0.0227*** -0.0234*** -0.0214*** -0.0164* -0.0193** -0.0198*** -0.0226*** 
 
(-3.090) (-3.162) (-2.893) (-1.960) (-2.500) (-2.599) (-3.074) 
S x COMPETITIVE 
 
0.0003 
     
  
(0.795) 
     S x UNIQUE 
  
-0.0011** 
    
   
(-2.524) 
    S x SYNCH 
   
0.0009* 
   
    
(1.778) 
   S x LOW 
    
-0.0005 
  
     
(-1.392) 
  S x HIGH 
     
0.0005 
 
      
(1.392) 
 S x HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0001 
       
(-0.303) 
bMKT 0.0003 0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.713) (0.980) (1.181) (0.841) (0.665) (0.665) (0.714) 
bHML 0.0021* 0.0026** 0.0023* 0.0028** 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0021* 
 
(1.887) (2.049) (1.901) (2.211) (1.919) (1.919) (1.870) 
bSMB 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.189) (-0.210) (-0.327) (-0.296) (0.182) (0.182) (0.197) 
LEVERAGE 0.0452*** 0.0435*** 0.0363*** 0.0425*** 0.0457*** 0.0457*** 0.0448*** 
 
(5.699) (5.304) (4.219) (5.154) (5.676) (5.676) (5.494) 
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COEFVAR 0.0091* 0.0085* 0.0076 0.0089* 0.0093* 0.0093* 0.0092* 
 
(1.850) (1.727) (1.526) (1.894) (1.903) (1.903) (1.846) 
GROW 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 
 
(1.798) (1.870) (1.797) (1.750) (1.806) (1.806) (1.822) 
        N 678 636 636 636 678 678 678 
  
Adj R2 0.079 0.076 0.084 0.082 0.080 0.080 0.078 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation with industry dummies. The dependent variable, ravg, 
is the mean of the four estimated models for the implied cost of equity capital minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in 
year t. LAG_SENTIMENT (S) is the lagged value of the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . All interaction terms 
are calculated with the respective lagged test variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appen-
dix A for variables description. 
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Table 9A 
Robustness Tests with Sentiment Measured in June 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES                                         
                  
Constant 0.3165*** 0.3721*** 0.3719*** 0.3723*** 0.3693*** 0.3682*** 0.3721*** 0.3720*** 
 
(8.609) (9.939) (9.927) (9.942) (9.964) (9.933) (9.930) (9.926) 
SENTIMENTJUNE 
(SJUNE) -0.0536*** -0.0732*** -0.0733*** -0.0734*** -0.0719*** -0.0716*** -0.0732*** -0.0731*** 
 
(-6.593) (-8.490) (-8.507) (-8.519) (-8.432) (-8.395) (-8.473) (-8.467) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
0.0017 
     
   
(1.043) 
     SJUNE  x COMPETITIVE 
   
0.0004 
    
    
(1.045) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0036** 
   
     
(-1.987) 
   SJUNE  x UNIQUE 
     
-0.0008** 
  
      
(-2.004) 
  HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0003 
 
       
(-0.164) 
 SJUNE  x HIGH_TECH 
       
-0.0001 
        
(-0.207) 
bMKT 
 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(0.224) (0.162) (0.162) (0.384) (0.387) (0.225) (0.226) 
bHML 
 
0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0028** 0.0026** 0.0026** 0.0028** 0.0028** 
  
(2.508) (2.508) (2.508) (2.385) (2.384) (2.501) (2.499) 
bSMB 
 
0.0004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
  
(0.269) (0.301) (0.300) (0.158) (0.155) (0.272) (0.273) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0537*** 0.0542*** 0.0542*** 0.0486*** 0.0486*** 0.0535*** 0.0534*** 
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(6.569) (6.601) (6.600) (5.570) (5.564) (6.353) (6.348) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0083* 0.0082* 0.0082* 0.0077* 0.0077* 0.0083* 0.0083* 
  
(1.841) (1.837) (1.837) (1.680) (1.678) (1.838) (1.839) 
GROW 
 
0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
  
(3.145) (3.209) (3.209) (3.197) (3.195) (3.165) (3.168) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.052 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.158 0.158 0.153 0.153 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable,     , is the mean of the four esti-
mated models for the implied cost of equity capital minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENTJUNE  is the natu-
ral log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index in June of year t . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic ro-
bust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A 
for variables description. 
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Table 9B 
Robustness Tests with Sentiment Measured in June 
 
  (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES                
        
Constant 0.3591*** 0.3490*** 0.3490*** 
 
(8.562) (8.348) (8.348) 
SENTIMENTJUNE (SJUNE) -0.0696*** -0.0678*** -0.0684*** 
 
(-7.054) (-7.102) (-7.274) 
SJUNE   SYNCH 0.0003 
  
 
(0.702) 
  SJUNE   LOW 
 
-0.0005 
 
  
(-1.477) 
 SJUNE   HIGH 
  
0.0005 
   
(1.477) 
bMKT 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.250) (0.231) (0.231) 
bHML 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0029*** 
 
(2.602) (2.591) (2.591) 
bSMB 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.201) (0.215) (0.215) 
LEVERAGE 0.0534*** 0.0537*** 0.0537*** 
 
(6.559) (6.531) (6.531) 
COEFVAR 0.0086* 0.0086* 0.0086* 
 
(1.929) (1.903) (1.903) 
GROW 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 
(3.132) (3.145) (3.145) 
    N 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.154 0.156 0.156 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. 
The dependent variable, ravg, is the mean of the four estimated models for the 
implied cost of equity capital minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June 
in year t. SENTIMENTJUNE is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment 
Index in June of year t. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with 
heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appen-
dix A for variables description. 
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Table 10 
Robustness Tests with Baker and Wurgler’s Sentiment Index 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES                                              
                    
Constant 0.0463*** 0.0454*** 0.0463*** 0.0498*** 0.0464*** 0.0465*** 0.0461*** 0.0462*** 0.0459*** 
 
(8.088) (7.768) (8.079) (8.460) (8.099) (8.031) (8.039) (8.049) (7.989) 
                  -0.0060*** -0.0060*** -0.0061*** -0.0058*** -0.0052*** -0.0060*** -0.0054*** -0.0076 -0.0052*** 
 
(-4.511) (-4.523) (-3.948) (-4.401) (-3.122) (-4.505) (-3.728) (-1.441) (-2.984) 
COMPETITIVE 
 
0.0017 
       
  
(0.967) 
              COMP 
  
0.0006 
      
   
(0.218) 
      UNIQUE 
   
-0.0042** 
     
    
(-2.313) 
            UNIQ 
    
-0.0027 
    
     
(-1.112) 
    HIGH_TECH 
     
-0.0006 
   
      
(-0.285) 
          HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0048 
  
       
(-1.561) 
         SYNCH 
       
-0.0008 
 
        
(-0.291) 
        HIGH 
        
-0.0022 
         
(-0.751) 
bMKT 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 
 
(0.761) (0.709) (0.760) (0.939) (0.789) (0.762) (0.706) (0.748) (0.720) 
bHML 0.0021* 0.0020* 0.0021* 0.0019* 0.0021* 0.0021* 0.0020* 0.0021* 0.0021* 
 
(1.854) (1.849) (1.851) (1.693) (1.860) (1.839) (1.778) (1.859) (1.847) 
bSMB 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 
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(0.217) (0.248) (0.216) (0.084) (0.185) (0.223) (0.281) (0.224) (0.249) 
LEVERAGE 0.0472*** 0.0477*** 0.0472*** 0.0414*** 0.0467*** 0.0468*** 0.0470*** 0.0471*** 0.0470*** 
 
(6.097) (6.130) (6.097) (5.079) (6.026) (5.897) (6.080) (6.084) (6.104) 
COEFVAR 0.0094** 0.0094** 0.0094** 0.0087* 0.0094** 0.0095** 0.0095** 0.0094** 0.0095** 
 
(2.035) (2.037) (2.040) (1.855) (1.993) (2.031) (2.029) (2.001) (2.024) 
GROW 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 
(2.188) (2.253) (2.184) (2.227) (2.210) (2.212) (2.269) (2.206) (2.240) 
          N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
  
Adj R2 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.103 0.098 0.097 0.099 0.097 0.097 
 
This table reports the results for Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation. The dependent variable, ravg, is the mean of the four estimated models 
for the implied cost of equity capital minus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t.                   is Baker and Wurgler’s com-
posite sentiment index. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statisti-
cal significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 11 
Robustness Tests with Claus and Thomas (2001) Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES kCT kCT kCT kCT kCT kCT kCT kCT 
                  
Constant 0.1805*** 0.1841*** 0.1843*** 0.1840*** 0.1820*** 0.1804*** 0.1829*** 0.1739*** 
 
(4.848) (5.510) (5.510) (5.510) (5.466) (5.409) (5.513) (4.754) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0166** -0.0234*** -0.0233*** -0.0232*** -0.0220*** -0.0216*** -0.0228*** -0.0210** 
 
(-2.016) (-3.089) (-3.077) (-3.069) (-2.891) (-2.833) (-3.029) (-2.578) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
-0.0012 
     
   
(-0.669) 
     S   COMPETITIVE 
   
-0.0003 
    
    
(-0.674) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0051** 
   
     
(-2.523) 
   S   UNIQUE 
     
-0.0012** 
  
      
(-2.579) 
  S   HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0012** 
 
       
(-2.463) 
 S   LOW 
       
-0.0017 
        
(-0.938) 
bMKT 
 
-0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  
(-1.562) (-1.506) (-1.506) (-1.339) (-1.333) (-1.469) (-1.587) 
bHML 
 
-0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0011 -0.0009 
  
(-1.045) (-1.017) (-1.018) (-1.416) (-1.422) (-1.221) (-1.002) 
bSML 
 
0.0051*** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0048*** 0.0048*** 0.0052*** 0.0050*** 
  
(3.915) (3.909) (3.908) (3.766) (3.762) (3.924) (3.850) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0403*** 0.0399*** 0.0399*** 0.0332*** 0.0330*** 0.0368*** 0.0405*** 
  
(4.054) (3.960) (3.959) (3.042) (3.031) (3.578) (4.030) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0067 0.0067 0.0067 0.0058 0.0058 0.0070 0.0069 
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(0.487) (0.489) (0.489) (0.427) (0.426) (0.508) (0.502) 
GROW 
 
0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0005* 0.0006* 0.0005* 
  
(1.737) (1.660) (1.660) (1.765) (1.763) (1.871) (1.745) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 0.005 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.058 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 1990 to 
2006.The dependent variable, kCT , is the implied cost of equity capital estimate based on Claus and Thomas (2001). SENTIMENT is the 
natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust stan-
dard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for 
variables description. 
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Table 12 
Robustness Tests with Easton (2004) Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES kES kES kES kES kES kES kES kES 
                  
Constant 0.2295*** 0.2535*** 0.2529*** 0.2541*** 0.2503*** 0.2481*** 0.2537*** 0.2138*** 
 
(6.075) (6.624) (6.642) (6.675) (6.639) (6.567) (6.610) (5.290) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0227*** -0.0369*** -0.0373*** -0.0376*** -0.0347*** -0.0342*** -0.0369*** -0.0275*** 
 
(-2.711) (-4.132) (-4.206) (-4.236) (-3.950) (-3.880) (-4.120) (-2.937) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
0.0050** 
     
   
(2.507) 
     S   COMPETITIVE 
   
0.0011** 
    
    
(2.480) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0076*** 
   
     
(-3.843) 
   S   UNIQUE 
     
-0.0017*** 
  
      
(-3.860) 
  S   HIGH_TECH 
      
0.0001 
 
       
(0.291) 
 S   LOW 
       
-0.0013*** 
        
(-3.366) 
bMKT 
 
-0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0013** -0.0013** 
  
(-2.276) (-2.521) (-2.518) (-2.040) (-2.038) (-2.287) (-2.395) 
bHML 
 
0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 0.0011 
  
(0.775) (0.729) (0.732) (0.434) (0.434) (0.792) (0.938) 
bSML 
 
0.0050*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0047*** 0.0047*** 0.0050*** 0.0048*** 
  
(3.392) (3.559) (3.554) (3.263) (3.260) (3.377) (3.299) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0628*** 0.0644*** 0.0644*** 0.0523*** 0.0522*** 0.0632*** 0.0636*** 
  
(6.588) (6.753) (6.750) (5.205) (5.194) (6.458) (6.590) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0157** 0.0155** 0.0155** 0.0144** 0.0144** 0.0156** 0.0163*** 
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(2.482) (2.539) (2.540) (2.252) (2.250) (2.478) (2.623) 
GROW 
 
0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
  
(2.990) (3.213) (3.210) (3.075) (3.069) (2.986) (3.098) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 0.010 0.127 0.134 0.134 0.143 0.144 0.126 0.140 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 
1990 to 2006.The dependent variable, kES , is the implied cost of equity capital estimate based on Easton  (2004). SENTIMENT is 
the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic ro-
bust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to 
Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 13 
Robustness Tests with Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) Cost of Equity Estimates 
           (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES kOJ kOJ kOJ kOJ kOJ kOJ kOJ kOJ 
                  
Constant 0.2983*** 0.3188*** 0.3181*** 0.3194*** 0.3157*** 0.3136*** 0.3190*** 0.2781*** 
 
(7.612) (8.007) (8.042) (8.073) (8.020) (7.949) (7.987) (6.669) 
SENTIMENT (S) -0.0362*** -0.0502*** -0.0507*** -0.0510*** -0.0482*** -0.0477*** -0.0504*** -0.0407*** 
 
(-4.173) (-5.418) (-5.502) (-5.531) (-5.248) (-5.178) (-5.401) (-4.198) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
0.0051** 
     
   
(2.453) 
     S   COMPETITIVE 
   
0.0011** 
    
    
(2.430) 
    UNIQUE 
    
-0.0072*** 
   
     
(-3.463) 
   S   UNIQUE 
     
-0.0016*** 
  
      
(-3.476) 
  S   HIGH_TECH 
      
0.0002 
 
       
(0.437) 
 S   LOW 
       
-0.0014*** 
        
(-3.311) 
bMKT 
 
-0.0016** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0016** -0.0016*** 
  
(-2.563) (-2.812) (-2.809) (-2.343) (-2.341) (-2.583) (-2.698) 
bHML 
 
0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
  
(0.110) (0.041) (0.045) (-0.238) (-0.238) (0.136) (0.264) 
bSML 
 
0.0058*** 0.0059*** 0.0059*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0057*** 0.0056*** 
  
(3.874) (4.045) (4.040) (3.753) (3.751) (3.859) (3.783) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0646*** 0.0662*** 0.0662*** 0.0545*** 0.0544*** 0.0652*** 0.0654*** 
  
(6.549) (6.713) (6.710) (5.218) (5.208) (6.441) (6.549) 
COEFVAR 
 
0.0182*** 0.0180*** 0.0180*** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** 0.0182*** 0.0189*** 
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(2.831) (2.909) (2.910) (2.628) (2.626) (2.831) (2.972) 
GROW 
 
0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 
  
(3.335) (3.568) (3.564) (3.402) (3.397) (3.321) (3.445) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 0.025 0.138 0.144 0.144 0.151 0.151 0.137 0.150 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 1990 
to 2006.The dependent variable, kOJ , is the implied cost of equity capital estimate based on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) mi-
nus the 3-month treasury bill returns for June in year t. SENTIMENT is the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical sig-
nificance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix A for variables description. 
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Table 14 
Robustness Tests with Gebhardt et al. (2001) Cost of Equity Estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES kGLS kGLS kGLS kGLS kGLS kGLS kGLS kGLS 
                  
Constant 0.0761** 0.0674** 0.0674** 0.0673** 0.0685** 0.0693** 0.0671** 0.0462 
 
(2.262) (2.134) (2.136) (2.130) (2.188) (2.222) (2.126) (1.290) 
SENTIMENT (S) 0.0020 0.0033 0.0034 0.0034 0.0026 0.0024 0.0035 0.0083 
 
(0.273) (0.462) (0.466) (0.468) (0.361) (0.341) (0.480) (1.013) 
COMPETITIVE 
  
-0.0005 
     
   
(-0.337) 
     S   COMPETITIVE 
   
-0.0001 
    
    
(-0.325) 
    UNIQUE 
    
0.0028 
   
     
(1.381) 
   S   UNIQUE 
     
0.0006 
  
      
(1.329) 
  S   HIGH_TECH 
      
-0.0003 
 
       
(-0.889) 
 S   LOW 
       
-0.0007** 
        
(-1.976) 
bMKT 
 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  
(0.339) (0.355) (0.354) (0.187) (0.190) (0.346) (0.343) 
bHML 
 
-0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0017*** -0.0016*** 
  
(-2.661) (-2.618) (-2.620) (-2.359) (-2.367) (-2.728) (-2.621) 
bSML 
 
0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0015 0.0014 
  
(1.301) (1.275) (1.276) (1.478) (1.475) (1.317) (1.230) 
LEVERAGE 
 
0.0363*** 0.0362*** 0.0362*** 0.0402*** 0.0401*** 0.0356*** 0.0368*** 
  
(6.562) (6.453) (6.452) (6.299) (6.282) (6.274) (6.594) 
COEFVAR 
 
-0.0197*** -0.0197*** -0.0197*** -0.0192*** -0.0192*** -0.0196*** -0.0193*** 
  
 
8
1
 
  
(-4.408) (-4.411) (-4.411) (-4.364) (-4.363) (-4.407) (-4.392) 
GROW 
 
-0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
  
(-2.994) (-2.937) (-2.935) (-2.989) (-2.988) (-2.956) (-3.003) 
         N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
Adj R2 -0.001 0.154 0.153 0.153 0.156 0.156 0.153 0.159 
 
This table reports Ordinary Least Squares regression estimation results. The sample consists of 679 industry-year averages from 1990 
to 2006.The dependent variable, kGLS, is the implied cost of equity capital estimate based on Gebhardt et al.  (2001). SENTIMENT is 
the natural log of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index . Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated with heteroscedastic robust 
standard errors. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Refer to Appendix 
A for variables description. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variables Description 
 
Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent Variables  
     Cost of equity derived from the Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001) model estimated in 
June of each year  
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
    Cost of equity derived from the Ohlson and 
Juttner-Nauroth (2005) model estimated in 
June of each year  
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
    Cost of equity derived from the Claus and 
Thomas (2001) model estimated in June of 
each year 
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
    Cost of equity defined derived from the Easton 
(2004) model estimated in June of each year 
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
     Industry average of the above four estimates 
across all Fama and French (1997) industry 
classification, excluding financial industries 
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
     Industry average equity risk premium calcu-
lates as      minus the rate of the 3-month US 
Treasury Bill 
Calculated estimate 
based on I/B/E/S and 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
Test Variables 
              Natural logarithm of the Michigan Consumer 
Confidence Index 
Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data 
   
            Baker and Wurgler (2006) composite senti-
ment index 
 
Jeffrey Wurgler official 
website 
      Synchronicity measure, proxy for information 
availability. Measured as a logarithmic trans-
formation of the industry average    from the 
CRSP 
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market model:           
   
 
     
    
 
       Unique industry dummy variable: 1 if the in-
dustry is in the bottom quartile of all 48 Fama-
French industries annually sorted by the indus-
try-median product uniqueness, 0 otherwise. 
Product uniqueness is defined as selling ex-
penses scaled by sales. 
Masulis et al. (2007) 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
   
            Competitive industry dummy variable: 1 if the 
industry is in the bottom quartile of all 48 
Fama-French industries annually sorted by the 
Herfindahl index, 0 otherwise. 
Masulis et al. (2007) 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
   
            
      
The sum of squared market shares of all 
Compustat firms in the industry with valid 
data on sales. 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
   
          High-tech industry dummy: 1 if the industry is 
defined as high-tech as in Grullon, Lyandres 
and Zhdanov (2010), 0 otherwise. 
 
   
          An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the unique in-
dustry dummy variable 
 
 
          An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the synchro-
nicity measure, proxy for information avail-
ability.  
 
 
                An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the competi-
tive industry dummy variable. 
 
 
    Low    industry dummy variable: 1 if 
SYNCH is below the median, 0 otherwise. 
 
   
     High    industry dummy variable: 1 if 
SYNCH is above the median, 0 otherwise. 
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        An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the low    in-
dustry dummy variable 
 
   
        An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the high 
   industry dummy variable 
 
 
QTi  
 
A    industry dummy variable identifying 
each quintile (i=1,2,3,4,5) sorted on SYNCH 
where QT1 is the bottom quintile and QT5 is 
the top quintile. 
 
 
 
       An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the corre-
sponding industry SYNCH dummy variable 
 
 
             An interaction term between the Michigan 
Consumer Sentiment Index and the high-tech 
industry dummy variable 
 
Control Variables 
     Loading of excess equity returns in the market 
factor of the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. A proxy for firm’s market risk. 
Averaged over the Fama-French 48 industry 
groups. 
Mamun and Mishra 
(2010) 
   
     Loading of excess equity returns in the small 
minus big (SMB) factor of the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model. A proxy for the 
firm’s size related risk. Averaged over the 
Fama-French 48 industry groups. 
Mamun and Mishra 
(2010) 
   
     Loading of excess equity returns in the high 
market to book minus low market to book 
(HML) factor of the Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model. A proxy for the firm’s 
market to book value related risk. Averaged 
Mamun and Mishra 
(2010) 
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over the Fama-French 48 industry groups. 
   
         Total Debt (Long Term debt plus Debt in Cur-
rent Liabilities) divided by Total Invested 
Capital. Averaged over the Fama-French 48 
industry groups. 
Research Insight 
/Compustat 
   
        Standard deviation of the estimated first year 
earnings per share divided by the mean earn-
ings per share forecast for the first year. Aver-
aged over the Fama-French 48 industry 
groups. 
I/B/E/S 
   
     I/B/E/S five-year earnings growth rate where 
available, otherwise estimated as the growth in 
forecasted earnings from year 1 to year 3. Av-
eraged over the Fama-French 48 industry 
groups. 
I/B/E/S 
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APPENDIX B 
Michigan Consumer Confidence Index 
 
The following description of the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index borrows heavily from 
Thompson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers
11
. The index is part of a 
broader consumer survey conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center, In-
stitute for Social Research. The Index of Consumer Expectations, produced by the Surveys of 
Consumers, is included in the Leading Indicator Composite Index published by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Michigan index began as an annual sur-
vey in the late 1940s. In 1952, it was converted to a quarterly survey and in 1978 it started being 
conducted on a monthly basis. 
The Survey of Consumers is a nationally representative survey based on approximately 
500 telephone interviews with adult men and women living in households in the United States. 
The sample incorporates a rotating panel sample design in an ongoing monthly survey program. 
Each month, an independent cross section sample of households is drawn. The respondents cho-
sen for the specific month are then reinterviewed six months later. The sample for each month 
contains up of 60% new respondents, and 40% interviewed for the second time. This approach 
enables regular assessment of change in attitudes and behaviour both at the aggregate and at the 
individual level. The survey methodology considers potential issues associated with demo-
graphic sampling, sampling error, sample coverage and nonresponse errors, telephone interview-
ing, coding methods, and institutional independence. 
The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is based on the following five questions: 
1. "We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. Would you say that 
you (and your family living there) are better off or worse off financially than you were a year 
ago?" 
2. "Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you (and your family living there) 
will be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?" 
3. "Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the 
next twelve months we’ll have good times financially, or bad times, or what?" 
4. "Looking ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole we’ll 
have continuous good times during the next five years or so, or that we will have periods of 
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widespread unemployment or depression, or what?" 
5. "About the big things people buy for their homes—such as furniture, a refrigerator, stove, 
television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or bad time for 
people to buy major household items?" 
The Index of Consumer Sentiment is calculated by first computing the relative scores (the 
percent giving favourable replies minus the percent giving unfavourable replies, plus 100) for 
each of the five survey questions. Each score is then rounded to the nearest whole number. The 
index is then constructed by summing the five relative scores (   ) and dividing by the 1966 base 
period total of 6.7558, and adding 2. The reason for adding this constant is to correct for a sam-
ple design change from the 1950s. 
   
               
      
    
 
The data series is not seasonally adjusted. The base period is the first quarter of 1966 = 100. 
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APPENDIX C 
Models Used to Estimate the Cost of Equity Capital 
 
This appendix provides information on the four models used to calculate the cost of equity esti-
mates. First, we define variables common to all four models. Then we show assumptions and 
specifications associated with each separate model. The method of implementation of these esti-
mates is based on Mamun and Mishra (2010). 
The models mainly differ in regard to their assumptions about the long-term forecast ho-
rizon as well as the used earnings growth rate. Another, modification of each model is its as-
sumptions about the growth rate beyond the terminal year (Guay et al., 2003). 
 
           = Cost of equity estimate of the model identified in the subscript. Cost of equity is 
computed as of the month of June of each firm year. 
 
       = I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecast per share for year t+τ recorded in June of the es-
timation year.       and       are equal to one and two-year ahead consensus earnings per 
share forecast reported in June of year t.       is equal to the three year-ahead consensus earn-
ings per share forecast when available, and       (1+LTG) when not available. 
 
   = I/B/E/S market price at the statistics release date for the estimation year 
 
     = FEPSt+i × Dividend Payout (firm’s dividend payout, where available, otherwise 50% as 
in Claus and Thomas (2001), dividend payout is truncated at 50%) 
 
     = earnings per share in year t 
 
LTG= long-term growth forecast in the month cost of equity is being estimated of year t 
 
    = book value per share for the estimation year calculated as:     =      +         –       
 
  = yield on a US Treasury bond in June of year t minus 2% 
 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) 
This model estimates the internal rate of return that equates the present value of expected future 
cash flows to the current stock price. The model assumes clean surplus accounting which allows 
the share price to be expresses in terms of forecasted returns on equity (ROE) and book values. 
FROEt+4 to FROEt+12 are forecasted such that ROE fades linearly to median industry ROE by T = 
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12. Year 12 residual income is earned in perpetuity assuming such rate is “value-neutral.” The 
valuation equation is: 
        
            
        
       
             
                
  
   
       
 
         Forecasted Return on Equity for period t+τ. For years one through three this vari-
able is equal to        /    . Beyond year three         is a linear interpolation to the indus-
try median ROE. 
            +               ). 
Industry ROE is based on the Fama and French 48 Industry Classification. Growth in earnings 
after the 12
th
 year is assumed to be zero. The cost of equity estimate is restricted between 0% and 
100%. 
 
Claus and Thomas (2001) 
The model assumes clean surplus accounting, thus the firm value can be expressed in terms of 
accounting numbers relying on the same theory as the discounted valuation model. Explicit fore-
cast horizon is set to 5 years. The forecast beyond two years are taken as reported by I/B/E/S 
where available. Otherwise they are generated based on the five-year consensus growth rate 
forecast or the average growth in       to      . The long-term growth rate beyond five years 
g = annualized US Treasury Bond yield minus 2%. KCT is restricted within 0–100%. Observa-
tions which do not converge are excluded. 
        
     
       
 
          
                
 
   
 
     =         -           
             +        (1 -     ) 
           . 
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Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
We will follow Gode and Mohanram’s (2003) implementation of the model. It is a generalization 
of the Gordon constant growth model. The explicit forecast horizon is set to 1 year. After that 
forecasted earnings grow at a near term rate (the average of the a percentage difference between 
the one year and two year ahead earnings forecasts, and the I/B/E/S long-term growth forecast), 
which is modeled as decaying to a perpetual rate (expected inflation rate). The dividend payout is 
assumed to be constant. 
          
       
  
            
where 
  
 
 
       
    
  
 
 
    = 
                
       
 
   = 
       
 
 
    =         . 
Easton (2004) 
This model is a generalization of the Price-Earnings-Growth model and is based on Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth’s (2005) model. The explicit forecast horizon is set to 2 years. After that, fore-
casted abnormal earnings are assumed to grow in perpetuity at a constant rate. The valuation 
equation is as follows: 
    
                           
   
   
In order to avoid spurious results associated with the use of only one model, we adopt the Dhali-
wal et al. (2006) and Boubakri et al. (2010) approach and compute the average cost of equity 
based on the four models. Then, we subtract the 3-month US Treasury bond yield from the esti-
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mated cost of equity which gives us the implied equity risk premium that we use as our depend-
ent variable. 
 
